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RESUME 
The recession of 2009 originating from United States of America did not let indifferent the global 
economy. Developing countries were expected to be resilient to the crisis, but small exporting countries 
were more likely to be hit by the recession. The 2009 recession was transmitted to Sub-Saharan Africa 
through trade and financial channels. The onset of the recession made the trade volume and the 
commodity price collapse. Moreover, FDI, Remittances, and foreign aids were significantly affected by 
this crisis. The IMF only note the decline net portfolio investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries less 
opened to global economy and those that were in good macroeconomic health were resilient to this shock. 
The goal of this paper, is to assess the impact of the 2009 recession on South Africa and Nigeria (two 
biggest African economies), evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy to recover the economic 
activity and understand the impact of G7 monetary policy on these countries. Building on regression 
model, the paper analyzes the factors explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in South Africa and 
Nigeria. This model is based on three blocks, namely the international block (G7-countries), South 
African block and Nigerian block, to capture the effect of external shock on each country separately. The 
model is built on the assumptions that all external shocks coming from neighboring countries or from 
monetary and economic unions (which SA and Nigeria are part) are endogenous for Nigeria and South 
Africa, i.e these two countries do not respond to these shocks (Local cross-border shocks are 
endogenous). This assumption pushes to construct a model considering G7 shocks and domestic shocks. 
The results reveal that the monetary policy effect on GDP during the recession was significant in Nigeria, 
but insignificant in South Africa. The results also point out that macroeconomic fluctuations in Nigeria 
and South Africa are generally influenced by monetary policy shocks, credit shocks (domestic and G7) 
and the trade channel (food price, terms of trade, etc.). 
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0. INTRODUCTION 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee, a 
recession refers to “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more 
than a few months, normally visible in production, employment, real income, and other indicators” 
(IMF, 2009). For the IMF, a global recession represents a decrease in real per-capita world GDP, 
sustained by a decline of other global macroeconomic indicators (industrial production, trade, capital 
flows, oil consumption, and unemployment).1 
Neo-Classical economic theory underlines that during a recession, it is up to the economy to self-regulate 
to return to stability. On the other hand, Keynesian economists sustain the government intervention, i.e 
they argue that any government should apply policies that can project the economy to full employment 
and restore economic stability. However, government intervention can in some cases amplify the 
recession insofar as policymakers have not detected the causal factors of the economic slowdown and/or 
the mechanism through which these factors have poisoned the economy. Government interventions are 
generally related to fiscal policy, monetary policy, mixed policy, or structural reforms. 
After the collapse of the American economy in 2009 owing to the global financial crisis (one year before), 
it could not let insensitive the rest of the world (with a world GDP share of 18%). Adamu (2009) argues 
that the financial crisis was followed by the collapse of important financial institutions which turned into 
economic contraction (2009’s recession). Hence, all governments shaken by the crisis had to come up 
with rescue packages to reconstruct their financial systems. Agendas of countries affected were mainly 
focused on recovery strategies, market restoration, and social protection programs (Kincaid et al, 2010). 
The following figure highlights the way GDP growth of countries over the world evolved during the 
2009 meltdown: 
Figure 1 GDP Growth by the level of development, 2002-2011 
 
Sources: World Economic Outlook; and IMF, African Department database (IMF, 2011). 
As can see in figure 1, high-income countries were more affected by the recession, because the latter was 
the source of the global economic slowdown. The least developed countries were less affected by the 
crisis, explained by the good macroeconomic trend in the pre-recession period and quasi-inexistence of 
factors that deepened the crisis (for instance the financial market). Keeley and Love (2010) explain that 
most low-income countries (Latin America, Africa, and Asia) felt the spillover effects of the 2009’s 
 
1 Bob Davis (senior editor on the wall street journal): What’s a Global Recession? (Apr 22, 2009) on 
The Wall Street Journal (Economics) repeated on https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/22/whats-
a-global-recession/ 
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recession, but countries less open to the global economy and those in the good macroeconomic run were 
not affected by the global calamity.  
Sub-Saharan Africa was not spared from the shock despite its weak integration into the global market. 
The strong dependence of developing countries on advanced economies made Sub-Saharan countries 
more vulnerable vis-à-vis external shocks. Thus, the monetary and fiscal policies applied by developed 
countries could considerably affect developing countries.  
 
Moreover, the impact of the 2009 global recession of advanced economies on Sub-Saharan Africa and 
other developing countries has been transmitted through different mechanisms. According to Arieff et 
al (2010), and Adamu (2009), Sub-Saharan African countries have been affected through the trade 
channel and the financial channel. Firstly, on the trade channel, the commodity prices (especially oil, 
ores & metals; and food prices) and the exports of goods and services slumped during the recent recession 
owing to the drop in global demand. The following figures show how commodity prices and exports 
evolved during the recession: 
Figure 2 World Commodity Price Index 
 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2012) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) exports are mainly focused on primary commodity goods (ores and metals, 
oil, and agricultural products) representing on average 56.66% of total exports2. Hence, the sharp 
decrease of commodity prices directly affects small open export-based economies by contracting real 
sectors (especially South Africa and Nigeria). The commodity price is supposed to be exogenous for a 
small open economy; i.e South Africa and Nigeria cannot exert any influence on it, the latter takes the 
price proposed by the world market. From 2012 to 2017, Nigeria represented 4.04% of World exports of 
oil (Kolomeytseva, 2019) and South African Platinum production accounted for 72% of World 
production (Fischer-Kowalski et al, 2015). Further, exports also follow the trend of commodity price 
by declining significantly during the 2009 recession, as one can see in the figure below:  
 
2 World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) platform: Sub-Saharan Africa Trade Summary 
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Figure 3  Sub-Saharan Africa exports 
 
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; and IMF, International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010) 
 
The figure above shows how Sub-Saharan countries' exports declined during the 2009 recession and 
recovered again due to the policies applied for economic stabilization. The exports declined from 44.2% 
of GDP in 2008 to 33.2% of GDP in 2009 (IMF, 2010). 
Secondly, SSA countries were affected through the financial channel, especially with a drop in Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), falling remittances from overseas workers, and cuts in foreign aid from 
developed countries (Arieff et al, 2010). On the other hand, the openness of capital inflow, financial 
market index, and private inflow & outflow in the percentage of GDP, could also induce the occurrence 
of global recession effects on developing countries. 
Being the biggest African economies (in the African real GDP) and more connected to the global 
economy through trade and finance flows; Nigeria and South Africa were more likely to be hit by the 
global recession. On geographic view, the southern part of Africa was more affected by the global 
recession, specifically South Africa in 2009. Indeed, the slowdown of the external demand for oil, 
minerals and precious stones has strongly contributed to the slowdown of the African economies (IMF, 
2010). Through quarterly analysis, we note that both SA and Nigeria have felt the crisis, but the SA 
meltdown were more drastic, as one can see in the figure below: 
Figure 4 Evolution of Nigerian and South African GDPs 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
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According to Houssa et al (2013, 2015, and 2019), the global shocks (demand, supply, commodity price, 
and credit shocks) play an important role in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in South Africa. 
They indicate that external shocks account for 20 to 30% in macroeconomic variations in South Africa. 
In particular, the commodity price and the credit are the main channels through which foreign shocks 
(especially G7 countries) affect the South African Economy. For Oladunni (2019), external shocks are 
transmitted to Nigeria trough trade channel (external demand shocks and oil price), financial channel 
(credit, funding, and non-banking channels) and the uncertainty channel (uncertainty occurs when agents 
are pessimistic or less optimistic regarding the tendency of domestic or/and global macroeconomic 
situation). He emphasizes that the global demand shock and oil price shock are the main foreign drivers 
of the Nigerian macroeconomic fluctuations. Indeed, the global demand shock drastically explains the 
evolution of the domestic GDP growth and inflation whereas oil price shock deploys high pressure on 
the domestic interest rate and the terms of trade. 
Furthermore, the dominance of Nigeria and South Africa in African exports and financial integration, 
explains why we took these countries as the study case for analyzing the way African Central Banks 
ruled monetary policy to respond to the 2009’s recession. It is crucial to note that the big part of African 
exports is oriented to Europe, one of the places hardly hit by the global recession. 
The steady growth, the low inflation, the sustainable fiscal balances, the rising foreign exchange reserves, 
and the declining government debt made almost Sub-Saharan African Economies on a good track. Thus, 
when the recession happened there was room for these economies to apply countercyclical monetary and 
fiscal 3 policies to maintain macroeconomic stability (IMF, 2010). However, Kraay and Serven (2013) 
find that almost developing countries applied procyclical fiscal policy by decreasing government 
expenditures to cushion the effect of recession.  
 
Being the cradle of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), developed countries were more affected by the 
recession; thus, conventional monetary policy was not enough to fix the economic crisis, even at lower 
zero-bound rates. Therefore, advanced economies applied unconventional monetary policy to sustain the 
traditional monetary policy. Kannan et al (2009) evaluated the responses of G7 to the recession. They 
state that both expansionary fiscal and monetary policies conducted, tend to curtail the duration of 
recessions.  
 
The Federal Reserve System and the European Central Bank played a main role in developed economies 
by decreasing the interest rate to lower zero-bound level. To sustain the lower zero-bound rates, the 
Federal Reserve System applied unconventional monetary measures, based on quantitative easing (QE)4. 
European Union was facing the global financial crisis and debt crisis. To supplement the classic monetary 
policy, the European Central Bank (ECB) implemented unconventional measures essentially focused on 
the banking system known as Enhanced Credit Support (credit easing) (Ferreira, 2015). 
 
Considering the effect of advanced countries on developing countries, not only the recession in developed 
countries has affected low-income countries (SSA included), but also developed countries’ responses 
impacted the latter during the recession and post-recession period. Gurara and Ncube (2013) find that 
the use of QE in developed countries has affected developing countries by exerting slight inflationary 
effects on developing economies putting pressure on exchange rate appreciation, through capital inflows. 
Further, Megersa (2017) explained that the announcement of unconventional monetary policy by the 
 
3 The countercyclical fiscal policy specific to recession represents a fiscal policy which stimulates the 
economic growth by increasing fiscal deficit. And the countercyclical monetary policy, allows the 
increase of economic growth by decreasing the interest rate (Chauvin and Geis, 2011). 
4 The QE refers to an unconventional monetary policy consisting for the central bank to purchase debt 
securities, treasury bills or corporate bonds in order to increase money supply. 
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FED and ECB has affected the price of financial assets in South Africa by decreasing yields, lowering 
the interbank rate, lowering credit default swaps (CDS) spreads, increasing stock market indices and 
appreciation of the rand; owing to the fact that the purchases of assets by central bank forced investors 
to look for substitute assets abroad.  
 
As part of this work we perform a comparative analysis. First, the present research evaluates the impact 
of the recession on South Africa and Nigeria. Second, it compares the two strong African economies in 
terms of the monetary policy conducted during the recession. 
 
Globally, the present research aims to find out and understand the role of monetary policy in Nigeria and 
South Africa during the recession and the post-recession period, by explaining the contribution of the 
monetary policy to the road of recovery. It is difficult to capture the effect of the monetary policy; while 
different shocks hit these economies, mainly external shocks (Demand, supply, monetary policy, 
commodity and credit shocks) and other domestic shocks (Demand, fiscal policy, supply shocks, etc.). 
Hence, we need to evaluate the role played by each shock on macroeconomic fluctuations in SA and 
Nigeria. Loayza and Raddatz (2006), Bahmani and Toms (2015), Houssa et al (2013, 2015, 2019), 
and Oladunni (2019) underline different factors which explain the fluctuation in emerging and 
developing countries. We build a model capturing the impact of each factor on SA and Nigerian GDPs 
and finally see whether the results are similar to empirical studies. 
This research focuses on 3 questions: 
▪ What is the impact of the 2009 global crisis on Nigeria and South Africa? 
All macroeconomic indicators show that both these two countries were affected by the global crisis. Sub-
Saharan African countries responded to 2009’s recession by easing procyclical fiscal and expansionary 
monetary policies. Thus, government expenditure declines after the occurrence of the great recession and 
increases when the economy recovered (positive co-movement between government expenditure and 
GDP). In response to the recession, policymakers lowered nominal interest rates quickly and by 
significant margins. When central banks tried to decrease the domestic interest rates in response to the 
economic slowdown, particularly in some countries with open capital accounts and floating exchange 
rate regimes, domestic interest rates often drifted upward because of rising external shocks (IMF, 2010). 
Houssa et al (2019) applied historical decomposition in an SOE-DSGE model to capture how domestic 
and foreign shocks affect macroeconomic fluctuations in SA. Oladunni (2019) used a historical 
decomposition tool in a VAR model to explain business cycles in Nigeria. To capture the impact of the 
global recession on both these two countries, we use business cycle analysis based on the amplitude of 
the crisis and identify which country have been more affected. The co-movement analysis is done to see 
the linkage between the GDP cycle and trade channel, financial channel and monetary policy cycles. 
Further, using regression model the paper evaluates which variable significantly explain the change in 
GDPs. 
▪ Was the monetary policy applied by SARB and CBN5 effective for economic growth? 
We analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy with respect to GDP growth i.e identify how strong the 
monetary policy affects economic recovery. The co-movement analysis can give an image the way the 
GDP evolved compared to the policy rate and see whether the change in policy rate did bring the 
improvement of GDP, knowing that the monetary policy frameworks of both countries are based on 
monetary and inflation targeting (Nigeria and SA respectively). The regression model brings more light 
on the impact of the monetary policy on the GDP growth. 
▪ How did SA and Nigeria respond to the advanced economies’ policies? 
Using regression model, we will identify whether Nigerian and South African responded to external 
monetary policy. Borensztein, Darius, and Kalemli-Ozcan (2019) explained that the unconventional 
 
5 SARB: South African Reserve Bank and CBN: Central Bank of Nigeria 
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monetary policy has destabilized the monetary policy implemented by developing countries as this policy 
has increased the capital inflow to developing countries exposing these countries to inflation tension. 
The remaining part of this research is based on four other points, namely the point 1 focused on the 
economic background of SA and Nigeria, point 2 is based on the literature review, point 3 is related to 
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1. BACKGROUND ON NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA  
The choice of working on South Africa and Nigeria is not random regarding the openness and economic 
of both these two countries in SSA. Hence, the major factors through which SSA countries were impacted 
are dominated jointly by South Africa (ores and metals exporter) and Nigeria (oil exporter). They also 
represent consequent share of SSA GDP and population. 
1.1. Contribution of SA and Nigeria on African economies 
Figure 5 South African and Nigerian share of SSA’ real GDP (2000-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using UNCTAD data 
From 2000 to 2017, both South Africa and Nigeria mainly represent 54.05% of SSA real GDP of all 44 
countries. The dominant share of South Africa and Nigeria implies that when both these two economies 
collapse, all SSA economies are hurt. 
Figure 6 South African and Nigerian share of SSA’ population 
 
Source: Author’s computation using UNCTAD data 
Regarding the share of population, South Africa and Nigeria represent 25.48% of SSA population.  
 
1.2.  Determinants of Transmission of the crisis 
The trade and financial channels are recognized as the main transmitters of shocks to developing 
countries, in this part we select some important variables. 
The export shares of Nigeria and South Africa add up to more than half the total exports of SSA from 










Nigeria South Africa Other countries









Nigeria South Africa Other countries
Average share of SSA population
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Figure 7 Goods and services export of SSA countries in % 
 
Source: Author’s computation using UNCTAD data 
From 2000 to 2013, the share of Nigeria in the exports of goods and services is on average equal to 
20.85% and South Africa represents 29.15%; i.e both these two countries represent 50% of Sub-Saharan 
African exports of goods & services. Given the fact that exports were affected by the crisis, both 
economies were more likely to be shaken. Houssa et al (2019) state that South African exports of goods 
and services are mainly dominated by primary commodity goods (especially mining) valued for 40% of 
total exports in merchandises and services. On the other hand, Oladunni (2019) shows that fuel export 
(oil included) represents the preponderant share of Nigeria’s trade with the rest of the world since it 
accounts for 80 to 95% of merchandise exports). Overall, the World Bank national accounts data and 
OECD National Accounts data files (2007-2017) reveal that trade represents on average 35.25% and 
61.62% of GDP respectively in Nigeria and SA, this implies that SA is more open to trade channel. 
Regarding the financial channel, Nigeria presents a higher degree of openness of capital inflow and 
financial market than SA, as we can see in the figures 5 to 6 below: 
Figure 8 FDI Stock in African Countries (2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using World dataset 
The recession has not as much affected the level of FDI Nigeria and South Africa represent, both the 
economies recorded a fall of FDI in percentage of GDP during 2010. This indicator is relevant to capture 

















FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
Nigeria FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
South Africa FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
SSA FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)
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Figure 9 Openness of Capital Inflows Index (1=fully liberalized) (Units) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using IMF data mapper6 
The figure reports that the more the country is closed to 1 there is more capital openness. This indicator 
shows that Nigeria has less restriction on regulation of foreign inflows compared to South Africa (the 
index is closed to 1). The capital inflows are one of the main transmitters of external financial shocks to 
developing economies.  
Figure 10 Financial Market Openness Index (equity, bond, money market, collective investment, 
derivate) 1= fully liberalized 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using IMF data mapper 
Moreover, the financial market openness index indicates that the Nigerian financial market is more 
liberalized than SA, and this index is flatter over time. Thus, this liberalization exposes the country to 
different external shocks that can occur in the financial market. 
Regarding private inflow and out in percentage of GDP, we note a huge decline during 2008 in both the 
two countries, owing to the Global Financial Crisis. The World Bank defines the Gross private capital 
flows as “the sum of the direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows included in the 
balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary 
authorities and general government” (Pham, 2010). The figures 11 to 12 below show how private capital 
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Figure 11 Private Inflows excluding Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using IMF data mapper 
Through the figure we can see that SA private inflows were strongly hit by the GFC compared to Nigeria, 
despite the high capital openness of the latter. On the other hand, private outflows followed the same 
trend as inflows, by decreasing strongly in 2008 (especially in SA) as we can see in the graph below: 
Figure 12 Private Outflows excluding Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using IMF data mapper 
Based on the World Bank Global Financial Development Database (2007-2013), foreign banks among 
total banks (%) represent 19.43% and 23.43% of total banks in Nigeria and SA respectively. The foreign 
bank assets among total bank assets (%) value 12.14% and 22.86% in Nigeria and SA. The two indicators 
give more light on the degree of financial openness of these two countries and how they were financially 
exposed to the global recession as long as the foreign financial institutions could trigger the crisis through 
sudden stops by refinancing native countries or/and spillover effects of stock market decline. Further, 
one more important indicator is the domestic credit to the private sector in the percentage of GDP, the 
index allows finding the role of domestic banks in financing the economy. Hence, we note that the SA 
economy is strongly financed by domestic credit compared to Nigeria's real sector (15.87% and 147.24%, 
respectively to Nigeria and SA). 
 
1.3.  Responses to the meltdown 
1.3.1. Nigerian response 
Nigeria is among those SSA countries which experienced positive annual GDP growth during the 
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policy rate. These facts allowed Nigeria to apply both procyclical fiscal and countercyclical monetary 
policies. The following graph highlights how Nigeria responded by increasing fiscal deficit (Figure 13):  
Figure 13 Nigerian Fiscal Deficit (Percent of GDP) 2003–2011  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (Ozsoz, 2017). 
To reach recovery, the Central Bank of Nigeria implemented the expansionary monetary policy by 
decreasing the policy rate to facilitate credit access and improve economic activity. Through the figure 
10, we can see the way central Bank of Nigeria managed the policy rate to improve financial conditions: 
Figure 14 Nigerian Monetary Policy Rate 2007–2010 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (Ozsoz, 2017). 
The recovery of Nigeria did not take many quarters to be reached as the country was economically stable 
before the onset of the recession. 
1.3.2. South African response 
South Africa is among the country seriously hit by the 2009’s recession in terms of negative GDP growth, 
unemployment, trade shocks, portfolio investment, FDI, etc. 
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Figure 15 South Africa Consolidated Fiscal Balance: (% of GDP) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Data (www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/south-africa/short-term-
interest-rate) 
 
Looking at South Africa and Nigeria’s fiscal deficit before the onset of the recession, they both had space 
to apply expansionary fiscal policy. However, Nigeria has more room to apply expansionary fiscal policy 
as the fiscal deficit was set low compared to South Africa. Nigerian fiscal deficit in 2008 was equal to -
0.20% of GDP and increased to -3.20% in 2009, while in South Africa the fiscal deficit increased from -
0.355% to -4.636% of GDP from 2008 to 2009. But in the periods preceding the global financial crisis, 
South Africa was on a good track compared to Nigeria regarding fiscal deficit.  
Figure 16 South Africa Short term Interest Rate 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Data (www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/south-africa/short-term-
interest-rate) 
  
Concerning monetary policy, South Africa presents a policy rate tending to 5% while Nigeria’s fund rate 
tended to 6% after the recession. Hence, South Africa used slightly more loosened monetary policy 
compared to Nigeria. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theoretical Literature  
Understanding the impact and policy of the African Central Bank during a recession requires first 
defining how central banks intervene using monetary policy to stabilize the economy. In this section, we 
aim to present different concepts related to monetary policy by explaining the instruments of monetary 
policy, the effects of each instrument on the economy and the monetary policy framework in South Africa 
and Nigeria. The present theoretical framework is essentially focused on approaches used by the central 
bank to manage economic indicators (inflation, recession, unemployment).  
During the 2009 recession, central banks all over the world used different tools to respond to this 
economic disaster; here we describe what the theory says about monetary policy tools. Hence, two points 
are developed respectively the central bank and monetary policy, and the joint use of monetary policy 
tools (empirical evidence). 
2.1.1. Central Bank and Monetary Policy 
The monetary policy refers to the instrument used by the central bank to respond to economic necessity 
in each country; it can be used for economic recovery goals or inflation stability. 
According to Warin (2005) and Epstein (2002) monetary policy is the procedure of controlling a 
country's money supply to achieve specific goals, for instance cushioning inflation, or reaching full 
employment. Blanchard (2009) explains that the primary tool of monetary policy is based on open 
market operations. He emphasizes that open market operations consist of the central bank to buy or sell 
securities to decrease or increase the money supply. The purchase of securities directly expands the 
money supply and decreases the level of interest rate, while the sale of securities contracts the money 
supply and increases the level of the interest rate. Moreover, the type of open market operation will 
depend on the goal the central bank wants to achieve. For instance, to dampen the recession the central 
bank needs to apply an expansionary monetary policy to finance the economic activity; on the other hand 
to reduce the inflationary pressure, the contractionary monetary policy (sale of securities) can be the right 
to tool to stabilize the price level. 
 
To conduct monetary policy, the central bank uses different instruments to reach its target (regarding 
what the central bank is aiming to fight). The central bank can use two types of instruments to conduct 
monetary policy, namely conventional and unconventional monetary measures.  
The conventional monetary policy tool is the central bank's control of the nominal interest rate; hence, 
the interest is lowered to create a facility of access to credit, which in return finances economic activities. 
However, unconventional monetary policy can be described as an additional category of monetary policy 
related to any other type of intervention conducted by the central bank, which has nothing to do with the 
interest rate control (Sheedy, 2017). 
 
A. Conventional monetary policy instrument 
The main instrument of conventional monetary policy is the control of a short-term interest rate; 
variations in the policy rate affect financial conditions (the availability and cost of funding) and the 
macroeconomic aggregates (public and private consumption, output, and inflation).  
 
Conventional monetary policy is transmitted from the policy rate to Economic activities comprising 
intermediary stages related to short-term funding markets, to longer-maturity bonds and bank funding 
and lending markets, exchange rates, and equity markets (Committee on the Global Financial System, 
2019). This transmission mechanism can hold under some conditions. First, it requires room for the 
policy rate to change in the favorite direction and not to face the constraint of the lower bound. Second, 
commercial banks must adjust the lending rate to changes occurred in the policy rate, otherwise, the 
effect will not be transmitted to households. For instance, during the recession, household activities are 
riskier, and then commercial banks are tempted to keep the lending rate high or put more restrictions on 
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credit access despite the policy rate cut. This situation can be a strong brake for the transmission of the 
policy rate cut to economic activity.  
 
B. Unconventional monetary policy instruments 
At a certain level the conventional monetary policy can be unable to stop the economic slowdown. Hence, 
the unconventional monetary policy can be implemented to make monetary policy effective. 
Unconventional monetary policy instruments include balance-sheet policies (quantitative easing and 
credit easing policies), emergency lending programs, and subsidized access to credit, macro-prudential 
policies, negative interest rates (Sheedy, 2017). 
a. Balance-sheet policies 
The balance-sheet policies refer to the increase of the central bank assets by purchasing bonds and other 
securities to widen the liquidity access in the economy. Numerous instruments can be used to stimulate 
credit access, for instance, quantitative easing, credit easing, etc. 
Blinder (2010) explains that the Quantitative easing (QE) represents the variation in the composition 
and/or size of a central bank’s balance sheet planned to facilitate liquidity and/or credit conditions. The 
goal of QE is to improve economic conditions by increasing the money supply through the central bank’s 
purchase of securities. Williamson (2016) adds that QE is mainly focused on purchasing long-term 
government securities than short-term government securities. The reverse of this policy can be called 
quantitative tightening referring to the contraction of liquidity and credit access. The credit easing 
consists of the central bank to purchase credit bond (treasure bills, mortgage-backed securities, etc.) to 
facilitate interbank credit connection. During the recession the Fed applied the quantitative easing to 
accompany conventional monetary measures, while the Euro-zone used the credit easing to stimulate 
interbank credit connection as numerous banks were drastically affected by liabilities. However, the 
Euro-zone shifted to QE in 2015, as this unconventional measure previously implemented did not bring 
to successful outcomes. 
b. Subsidized credit and Macro-prudential policies 
The unconventional monetary policy can be related to subsidized credit access from either the central 
bank or government. This policy is financed by lump-sum taxes. To avoid the increase in credit risk, 
macro-prudential policies provide limitations on credit access above and beyond the value of the housing 
collateral. This restriction is defined as a maximum loan-to-value ratio for borrowers (Sheedy, 2017).  
c. Negative interest rate  
Williamson (2016) underlines that after the 2009’s recession; some central banks over the World applied 
negative nominal interest rates to mainly sustain the increase of inflation. For instance, the Swedish 
Riksbank, the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan, lowered their 
nominal interest rates below zero. 
 
2.1.2. The joint application of conventional and unconventional monetary policies: stylized facts 
To fight the recession in 2009, central banks of developed countries mostly combined conventional 
monetary policy and balance-sheet policies, especially quantitative easing and credit easing, while, in 
developing countries (SSA in particular), Central banks conducted conventional monetary policy by 
cutting the nominal interest rate. 
The magnitude of the recession faced by developed countries (G7 in particular) made the interest control 
unable to cushion the global recession. The Fed, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank 
started by decreasing the policy rate until near zero-bound rate but the monetary policy remained 
ineffective, they resorted to the balance-sheet policy to stabilize their economies (Joyce et al, 2012).  
The figures below expose how conventional and unconventional monetary policies were jointly 
conducted in the US and the Eurozone. Through these graphs we can note that the balance-sheet policy 
and the policy rate were negatively co-moved in advanced economies, i.e during the pre-recession period 
balance sheets of central banks in advanced economies were low while the policy rate is high; when the 
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recession occurs, the balance sheets of central banks started increasing through the purchase of securities 
while the policy rate decreased down to near zero-bound.  
Figure 17 US Federal Reserve Policy Rate and Balance Sheet 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters DataStream, Federal Reserve, and Bank of England 
calculations (Joyce et al, 2012). 
 
Farmer (2012) shows that the balance-sheet of the Fed increased by approximately 800 to over 2,000 
billion dollars from 2007 to 2008. Through the figure above, we can also note the huge decrease in policy 
rate down to near zero bound. The Federal Reserve also applied “Operation Twist”; it consisted of the 
Fed to sell short-term government bonds and buy long-term bonds. The goal was not to raise the size of 
the balance sheet of a central bank but to affect non-standard interest rates (Warin, 2005). 
Figure 18 European Central Bank Policy Rate and Balance Sheet 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters DataStream, European Central Bank, and Bank of England 
calculations (Joyce et al, 2012). 
Regarding the figure above, we note that the ECB increased its balance sheet by 2.5% to 30% from 2007 
to 2012, while the policy rate declined from 3.5% to near 1%. However, despite the joint application of 
CMP and UMP, the recovery of Europe delayed compared to the US. This could be explained by the 
type of unconventional tool chosen by the ECB (credit easing) and the debt crisis in the Euro-zone. 
 
It is important to note that the effects of the monetary policy applied by developed countries did not let 
open small economies indifferent; more opened SSA economies were affected. Rather than only respond 
to the global recession, they were also constrained to respond to spillover effects of the monetary policy 
conducted in developed economies. 
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2.1.3. Monetary policy frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa 
A) Central Bank of Nigeria Monetary policy frameworks 
a. The Mandate of the CBN (CBN Act 2007) 
The central bank of Nigeria Act 2007 gives the charge for modeling and running monetary policy in 
Nigeria to the CBN. So far, the function was exerted by the CBN supervised by the Ministry of Finance 
in complicity with the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Under the 2007 CBN Act, the Bank 
performs its monetary policy functions through the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC was 
established by the CBN in 1999 to anchor the task of monetary policy formulation (CBN, 2016). 
Specifically, the Act provides that the MPC will help to facilitate the attainment of price stability; and 
support the economic policy of the Federal Government. 
b. The Objectives of Monetary Policy in Nigeria 
The monetary policy in Nigeria aims to attain price stability, maintain external payments equilibrium, 
promote employment and output growth, and sustain economic development. Where the stability of the 
financial system is vulnerable, these short- and long-term objectives could be subordinated to the 
essential objective of reaching financial stability (CBN, 2011). 
 
Given the CBN Act 2007, the main goal of monetary policy is to ensure monetary and price stability. 
Generally, the monetary policy of the CBN is attached on four main pillars: Inflation as a monetary 
phenomenon; the public’s expectation of future inflation (allows people to better plan future investment 
and consumption); proactive and rule based monetary policy; and independence of the central bank to 
fix monetary policy. 
c. Instruments of Monetary policy in Nigeria 
Policy instruments are mainly based on the interest rate, this indicator is used by the CBN to achieve its 
goals. The interest rates currently used in monetary policy by the CBN include the interbank discount 
rate, the treasury Bill rate, the saving deposit rate, the fixed deposit rate, the lending rate, and Monetary 
Policy Rate (MPR), with the MPR serving as the anchor rate (IMF, 2019). The Central Bank of Nigeria 
through the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) conducts monetary policy using the instruments 
available which in turn impact the supply of money. This will finally reach the goal by affecting inflation, 
exchange rate, economic growth, etc.  
d. Evolution of CBN’s Monetary Policy strategies 
The Nigerian monetary policy has evolved over time through different monetary policy framework, 
building on exchange rate targeting in 1959-1973 and monetary targeting (direct era from 1973 to 1993 
and indirect era in 1993-date). Central banks work under well-defined methods and techniques to reach 
the ultimate purposes of monetary policy. Theses goal can be related to different factors: ultimate 
(inflation, nominal GDP, exchange rate, etc.) or intermediate variables (the money supply and market 
interest rate), etc. (CBN, 2016) 
i. Exchange Rate Targeting (1959-1973) 
The exchange rate targeting is also called exchange rate peg. It is related to the fixing of the value of the 
domestic currency in respect of another low inflation currency. This strategy started in the pre - World 
War I era, when the gold standard was in use. In this period, the almost countries’ currencies were 
converted to gold at fixed exchange rates (CBN, 2011).  
 
In recent era, exchange rate targeting implies fixing the value of a domestic currency to another called 
the anchor currency. Choosing the foreign currency anchor generally be subject to the relative stability 
and low rate of inflation of that country as well as the relative weight of its trade in the anchoring 
country’s international trade with the anchored country’s currency.   
 
The implementation of this monetary policy framework in Nigeria during the colonial period was mainly 
conducted under economic conditions in Britain.  The framework began with fixing the exchange rate 
between the Nigerian currency and the British pound (Nnanna, 2001). The challenge of finding the right 
anchored currency, pushed the CBN to shift to monetary targeting (in 1967 when the British pound 
devalued, the CBN switched to US dollar and once again in 1970s when the US dollar depreciated, the 
British pound became the anchored currency). 
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ii. Monetary Targeting (1973-Date) 
From 1970, the economy faced a major structural change that impacted the management of monetary 
policy. The Oil dominance in the export basket, representing 57.6% of total export in 1970 and over 96% 
from 1980. Whereas non-oil exports (mainly agriculture) dropped speedily from 42.4% in 1970 to 16.9% 
in 1973.  The requirement to finance post-war developments also led to a drastic growth in public 
spending has increased inflationary pressures. Given this situation, the monetary authorities adopted a 
new monetary policy framework. The monetary targeting in Nigeria involved the use of market (indirect) 
and non-market (direct) instruments (Nnanna, 2001). This strategy aims to control monetary aggregates 
and builds on the assumption that the inflation is basically a monetary phenomenon. 
❖ Direct Control, 1973-1993 
The major objective of monetary policy during this period was to promote rapid and sustainable 
economic growth. Indeed, the monetary authority imposed quantitative interest rate and 
credit ceilings on the deposit money of banks and prescribed sectoral credit allocation to the various 
sectors of the economy. Different sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing and construction, were 
targeted for the most favored treatment, in terms of generous credit allocation and a below-market lending 
rate (Nnanna, 2001). 
❖ Indirect monetary control (1993 to date) 
The indirect monetary policy required the use of market instruments to regulate the growth of major 
monetary aggregates. Under this framework, only the operating variables, the monetary base or its 
components are targeted, while the market is left to determine the interest rates and allocate credit. These 
instruments are related to open market operations, reserve requirement, discount window operations and 
moral suasion (Nnanna, 2001). This indirect monetary policy is focused on inflation targeting as a 
nominal anchor.  As the final target for all regimes was to guarantee the price stability, the graph below 
highlights the way the inflation evolved under the 2 different types of monetary policy framework: 
Figure 19 Headline Inflation under Different Monetary Frameworks in Nigeria 
 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi (2014) 
 
The up-mentioned figure displays that the Nigerian monetary policy framework switched from exchange 
rate targeting with low inflations to a direct monetary targeting characterized by high price volatility. 
Looking at the headlines of inflation, the shift from direct monetary policy to indirect monetary policy 
brought the inflation from more than 70% to less than 20%. This can be related to the implicit attention 
of the indirect control of monetary policy on price stability. However, we cannot only attribute the change 
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e. Challenge to monetary policy in Nigeria 
The challenges to the effective implementation of monetary policy in Nigeria includes the following: 
- Operating cost: this mainly refers to the cost of liquidity management. The capacity of the 
central bank to preserve certain level of liquidity in the economy would require some interest 
payments and cost of liquidity management. 
- Fiscal dominance: this is related the level at which the monetary policy finance fiscal 
deficit. As a member of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
monetary policy is required to finance 10% of public deficit. The Nigeria always face the 
challenge of meeting this threshold. 
- Structural rigidities: this challenge refers to factors that constrain the mobility of resources 
between producers and consumers. The present phenomenon leads to the artificial price 
increases that have not arisen because money supply grows faster than the production of 
goods and services.  
- External shocks: the Nigerian Monetary policy is in fact affected by external shocks through 
the foreign exchange rate of the Naïra. The crude oil price shocks at the international oil 
market makes the exchange rate depreciation limits monetary policy’s capacity to fix the 
price stability goal. The depreciation of Naïra will lead to the rise of the price of imported 
goods, which turns to increase the domestic price level. 
 
B) Central Bank of South Africa Monetary policy framework 
The section 224 of the South African Constitution and the section 3 of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) Act state the central bank must exert its function in all independence. The primary objective 
pursued by the SARB is to achieve and maintain price stability; empower and ensure a healthy banking 
sector. Moreover, it is up to the central bank to guarantee, the maintenance of the value of local currency. 
a. Monetary policy in South Africa (1965-1994).  
The Apartheid in South Africa during this period increased International pressures, this required to 
implement some financial repressive policies to prevent capital outflows and to keep economic stability. 
Indeed, monetary policy was mainly used driving to control the financial sector (Muyambiri and 
Odhiambo, 2014).  
 
Since the 1960s there have been three broad monetary policy frameworks. The first framework was a 
liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit, and 
operated until the early 1980s. some reforms were applied from the early 1980s focused cash reserves-
based system followed the recommendations of the de Kock Commission Reports (1978, 1985). After 
changes on assets requirements, and redefining the role of the discount rate, this second regime started 
functioning in the mid-1985. The supply of credit was influenced by open market operations. The 
monetary policy framework targeting M3 started in the early 1986 (Aron and Muellbauer, 2006). 
b. The monetary policy framework of South African Reserve Bank in the 1990s 
During this period, the goal of central bank was to ensure the value of the South African currency, to 
finally pull down the rate of inflation. The process of stabilizing general price level faced a complex 
transmission mechanism, time consuming and consequently difficult to manage. Hence, South African 
monetary authorities preferred to achieve intermediate targets (money supply, exchange rate, etc.), which 
will turn into the ultimate target achievement (price stability). In South Africa, the monetary policy 
regime (monetary targeting framework) in the 1990s incorporated the use of money supply targets up 
until 1998.  
 
Moreover, any the money supply targeting is focused on the belief that the inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon. The effective control of the rate of growth of the money supply over time, will turn to the 
inflation control. The Publication of targets may provide some reference lines to the business community, 
consumers and labor interests concerning future expectation on money and price. On the other hand, 
targets on the money supply can also be crucial in restricting the propensity of governments to spend 
public funds, as the central bank can recommend to politicians that public expenditure in excess of certain 
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levels could entail exceeding the money supply targets if such spending is financed by resort to bank 
credit. The money supply-targeting policies, which were first appeared in 1988 in respect of the De Kock 
Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa (SARB, 2011). 
 
The broad monetary aggregate M3 was recognized as the most appropriate for money supply-targeting 
by the South African reserve Bank. For instance, the target growth range for M3 for 1995 was fixed at 
between 6% and 10%. Progressively, lower targets for the growth in M3 had been applied since monetary 
targeting was first introduced in South Africa in 1988. Between 1989 and 1993, we can note a decline in 
the growth of broad money explained by the contraction of the economy during this period. Finally, 
monetary targeting was rejected in South Africa early in 1998 and moved the inflation targeting.  
Further, several challenges were related to the application of this monetary policy regime: 
▪ There was no insurance that the relationships between the money supply and total demand, and 
the money supply and inflation would in any way be stable or predictable.  
▪ There were uncertainties about the unavoidable time lags that existed between changes in the 
money supply and the rate of inflation, i.e the change in broad cannot immediately transmit to the 
change in inflation. According to SARB (2011), empirical analyses in some other countries 
suggested that this time lag could be two years or more.  
▪ Instability in the demand for money affect the attainment of the level money targeted; 
▪ Choice of monetary measure to target: Another problem with money supply targeting concerned 
the choice of an appropriate monetary measure to use for targeting purposes. It was not easy to 
determine a permanently suitable measure of the money supply that could be employed. In South 
Africa, we note the problem of the central bank to reach the broad money targeted (SARB, 2011). 
c. Inflation targeting regime 
Adopted in 2000, the inflation targeting pursued to improve policy transparency, accountability 
and predictability.  Presently, the inflation target aims to attain a rate of increase in the overall consumer 
price index, excluding the mortgage interest cost (the so-called CPIX), of between 3 and 6 percent per 
year. CPIX is defined for metropolitan and urban areas and has a wider coverage of households (80 
percent) than CPI (metropolitan), with only 40 percent coverage. However, modelling and forecasting 
with CPIX (metropolitan and urban) is complicated by the fact that it is published back only to 1997. 
 
The target range was initially fixed by the Ministry of Finance but is now set by the National Treasury 
(a department of the Ministry of Finance), after discussion with the SARB. The Inflation Targeting 
Technical Committee (ITTC) was established in 2001, with National Treasury and SARB representation, 
to address technical issues.  
 
However, SA is a small open economy, subject to exogenous shocks which have impact on inflation. For 
instance, a sudden rise in oil prices or a drought impacting food prices may cause a deviation from the 
target, over which monetary policy has little immediate influence. Monetary policy can be expected to 
react to the second-round effects, and apparent changes induced in inflationary expectations (Aron and 
Muellbauer, 2006). The inflation targeting design is presented in the down-mentioned graph: 
 
Figure 20 The Inflation Targeting Framework 
 
Source: Meyer, Chipeta and Camel (2018) 
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According to Meyer, Chipeta and Camel (2018), different empirical studies have revealed the 
efficiency of inflation targeting in addressing macroeconomic issues in South Africa and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability compared to the previous monetary policy frameworks. The CPIX decreased 
from double-digit levels in early 1990s to single digits, reaching the target of 3 to 6% in 2001. Thereafter, 
in 2002 the CPIX raise to double digit levels again owing to a sharp depreciation of the currency but 
returns once again on the target range. From 2007 inflation raised mainly explained by external food and 
oil prices shocks. In 2009, the inflation decreased due the fall in output level (Kearney and Odusola, 
2011). The repo rate is the main instrument used by the SARB to control the inflation.  
 
2.2. Empirical literature 
The present section is mainly focused on empirical findings related to the recession, its impact on African 
economies; evaluation of main drivers of macroeconomic volatility in developing and emerging market, 
and policy responses to economic crisis.   
The existing literature explains that the recession did not affect developing countries at individual level, 
but in terms of global impact, low-income countries (LICs) were slightly affected. As one of the main 
cradles of developing economies, the impact of the global recession on African countries was expected 
to be low, given its weak integration to international trade and financial markets. Osakwe (2010) shows 
the evident existence of global recession’s impact in all categories of African countries (oil-exporting, 
middle-income, low-income and economies strongly based on agriculture). This author explains that 
when the recession happened, the number of countries with negative GDP growth rates increased from 2 
to 8. According to the IMF (2010), among the five biggest SSA economies (South Africa, Nigeria, 
Angola, Ethiopia, and Kenya) representing two-thirds of the region’s output, only South Africa 
experienced a negative GDP growth in 2009. This can be explained by its exposure to the global economy 
through trade, financial market, and capital inflows.  
 
Indeed, Loayza and Raddatz (2006), Bahmani and Toms (2015), Houssa et al (2013, 2015, 2019), 
and Oladunni (2019) emphasize that macroeconomic fluctuations of developing and emerging countries 
are jointly explained by internal and external shocks (financial and trade shocks). These authors applied 
different approaches to explain the way countries’ economic volatilities are affected through foreign and 
domestic shocks. For instance, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, the vector 
autoregressive (VAR), and regression model are generally used to capture the main conductors of 
macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging market and developing countries. These approaches differ on 
assumptions, modeling and analytical point of view. DSGE and VAR models allow the capturing the 
amplitude of different shocks hitting the economy (these approaches require the establishment of strong 
assumptions regarding the time of the occurrence of shocks’ impact and countries’ characteristics), while 
regression model establishes a possible linkage the economy and different exogenous factors. 
 
In the spirit of assessing the vulnerability of countries to external shocks, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) 
evaluate the way country’s specific structural characteristics affect the impact of the terms of trade shocks 
on the aggregate output. Thus, an econometric methodology built on semi-structural vector auto-
regressions was conducted. This model focused on the identification assumption that domestic shocks 
are endogenous to external variables (especially the terms of trade).  This paper used annual panel data 
of 90 countries (36 low-income countries, 36 middle-income countries, and 18 high-income countries) 
for the period 1974-2000. On the other hand, the country’s domestic structural characteristics are mainly 
related to trade openness, financial development, capital account openness, labor flexibility, and firm 
entry flexibility for country.  
They find that the higher trade openness is, the more the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on the output 
will be higher. However, higher financial depth appears having no effect on the impact of terms-of-trade 
shocks (this is the reverse of the theoretical expectations which suppose the financial depth to be a remedy 
for external vulnerability). The raise of financial openness exerts a negative effect on the impact of a 
terms-of trade shock, though a modest margin. The firm entry flexibility has a slight increasing effect of 
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terms-of-trade shocks, while it is not statistically significant. Finally, the increase in labor market 
flexibility reduces drastically the impact of the terms-of-trade shocks on per capita GDP.  
 
However, authors analyze the effect of external shocks on the GDP remaining focused on one aspect 
through which countries can be affected by external shocks. Terms of trade is not enough to explain 
external vulnerability of a countries. IMF (2010) stressed different channels through which international 
macroeconomic shocks can affect a developing economy, namely through trade and financial channels. 
Loayza and Raddatz (2006), did not consider the financial channel (external credit to private sector, 
FDI, portfolio investment, foreign aids, remittance, etc.), while they selected financial domestic 
characteristics (capital openness & financial development) to explain the impact of the terms-of-trade on 
the output. There is a stronger linkage between foreign financial shocks and these domestic financial 
characteristics selected, than the possible relation between the latter and the terms of trade. The 
transmission of external shock through trade channel, is mostly done though the terms of trade, the price 
of commodity exported by the country and the volume of trade. However, these authors, took a single 
postulate of trade channel (the terms of trade). Thus, to have a complete view of the impact of the external 
shocks on the GDP, it would be crucial to also consider the external financial shocks in their model as 
control variables. 
 
Further, to address the question related to the role of external financial shocks in the macroeconomic 
fluctuations of developing & emerging countries, Houssa et al (2013) study the effects of global and 
domestic credit supply shocks in macroeconomic fluctuations for Emerging Markets (especially the 
South Africa). To observe the possible credit effects, the paper run a set of zero and sign restrictions7 
based on a medium-scale Bayesian Vector Auto-Regressive (BVAR) model.  
 
The results from Houssa et al (2013) show that shocks related to G7 countries play an important role in 
the fluctuations of real activity in South Africa. Moreover, three types of G7-shocks (G7- credit shocks, 
G7- productivity shocks, G7- demand) have contributed significantly to the 2007-2010 recession, while 
South African real activity were mainly driven by productivity shocks in the 1990-1992 recession 
episode. Overall, the trade and the credit shocks are the main transmission channels of international 
shocks hitting South Africa in 2007-2010, while in 1990-1992 the commodity price channel dominated 
external shocks.  
 
Moreover, the previous paper did not address the two-country comparison in the evaluation of 
determinants of macroeconomic fluctuations on developing countries. Indeed, Houssa et al (2015) 
evaluate the role of global and domestic shocks to explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in Ghana 
compared to South Africa. Particularly, this paper studies the impact of exogenous shocks (productivity, 
credit supply, and commodity price shocks) on the South African and the Ghanaian economies. To 
capture these shocks,  a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model was used, estimated through Bayesian 
methods. Hence, the identification of shocks is applied by imposing of sign and recursive restrictions of 
Uhlig (2005) jointly for credit and productivity shocks. Quarterly data from Ghana, South Africa and 
G7-countries are used from 1985: Q1- 2010: Q3.  
 
 
7 Zero restrictions permit to distinguish domestic from international shocks (this supposes that developed 
countries do not respond to shocks originating from emerging markets), while sign restrictions allow 
differentiating credit supply shocks from credit demand shocks (credit demand shocks are addressed to 
endogenous responses of indicators of credit market to fundamental shocks while credit supply shocks 
are not related to fundamentals). 
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The results suggest that the South African output has strongly responded to the global credit supply 
shocks, reversely to Ghana. On the other hand, the credit supply shock decreases commodity prices in 
South Africa, while increasing them in Ghana. The effects of the credit shock bring to an increase in 
interest rates in Ghana and South Africa (the impact is only significant for a short period). The commodity 
price shocks are also more significant for South Africa than for Ghana. Ghana’s integration to global 
economy passes more through trade channels, and less through financial channels. Finally, the paper 
finds that commodity shocks are an important explainer of macroeconomic fluctuations in both countries. 
 
Houssa et al (2013,2015) are complementary papers, the particularity of Houssa et al (2015), is the 
comparison spirit between developing and emerging countries holding different degrees of capital and 
trade openness. Through this paper, one can see that the output of the country financially integrated to 
global economy is more likely to suffer from global credit supply shock occurrence (South Africa).  
 
Furthermore, Houssa et al (2019) focus on a small open economy dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (SOE-DSGE) model to capture the business cycle linkage between an emerging economy 
(South Africa) and advanced economies. Primary commodity, manufacturing, intermediate inputs, and 
credit are fundamental to explain the amplitude and the transmission chain of domestic as well as foreign 
shocks8 shaking the developing economies. Shocks which cannot clearly be defined as foreign or 
domestic, are denoted SOE shocks. This paper estimates the SOE-DSGE model with Bayesian methods 
based on quarterly data on South Africa, the US and G7 on the period 1994Q1-2017Q4.  
 
Houssa et al (2019) suggest that foreign shocks explain 20% of macroeconomic fluctuations in South 
African real economy over the 1994 to 2017 period. These shocks explain in fluctuations of GDP (24%), 
consumption (21%), investment (22%), mining exports (18%) and the risk-free rate (17%), labor 
compensations (26%), spread (37%), imports (6%), exports (12%), consumer price index (14%) and 
nominal exchange rate (11%). SOE shocks contribute about 77% on fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
83% in imports and 69% in exports.  Domestic shocks represent the main explainer of economic 
fluctuations (explain two-third of variations in GDP, consumption and investment and about half of 
changes in CPI and the risk-free rate). Domestic shocks also account for 72% fluctuations in mining 
output owing to domestic commodity supply shocks. On the other hand, the fluctuations in imports 
(11%), exports (19%) and the exchange rate (11%) are weakly explained by domestic shocks. 
 
Comin et al (2010) remain in the same perspective of explaining the linkage between developed and 
developing countries’ macroeconomic fluctuations, they analyze the way the diffusion of technology 
influences the productivity in developing countries. Thus, based on a two-country asymmetric DSGE 
model with two characteristics: endogenous and slow diffusion of technologies from the developed to 
the developing economies, and adjustment costs to investment flows, this work used annual data on the 
period 1990-2008 to explain the linkage business cycle fluctuations. The goal is to apply a model able to 
explain the amplitude and persistence of the effect that U.S. shocks have on Mexico’s real economy and 
display different drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries.  
 
The findings suggest that U.S. business cycle fluctuations affect the speed of diffusion of technologies 
to Mexico and this channel drives the medium-term level of intrinsic productivity. This paper particularly 
underlines the effect of developing country shock on developed economy owing to cross-borders 
activities. Hence, Mexican shocks account for 2% to 3% of U.S. fluctuations over the medium-term 
cycle. However, U.S. shocks are important source of macroeconomic fluctuations in Mexico (over the 
medium-term cycle, U.S. shocks account for 66% of the volatility in Mexican GDP).  
The particularity of this paper is twofold. It exposes the possible role that developing countries can play 
in explaining volatility in advanced economies, and the diffusion of technology on developing countries’ 
 
8 These shocks are related to Aggregate supply, aggregate demand, monetary policy, credit, primary 
commodity 
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productivity. However, compared to Houssa et al (2013, 2015, 2019), Comin et al (2010) show a strong 
influence of external shocks on developing country due to neighboring linkages. 
 
As found by Houssa (2015, 2019), the commodity price is among the main drivers of foreign shocks on developing 
countries. Hence, the food, mining product and oil prices are especially the main catalyzers of Sub-Saharan 
countries’ external vulnerability. Oladunni (2019, p20-67) analyzes the external vulnerability of oil-export 
country. He uses a sign restricted Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (BSVAR) to explore how 
three external shocks, respectively: global demand, oil price and the US monetary policy shocks impact 
on the Nigerian macroeconomic fluctuations. Quarterly data were used for analysis from 1982: Q1 to 
2016: Q1 for first sample and the second sample covers 1982: Q2 to 2007Q4 (the second excludes the 
GFC period to 2016: Q1 to verify whether the GFC affects significantly the results). Findings suggest 
that the global demand shock and oil price shock are the main foreign shocks that affect Nigerian 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Hence, the global demand shock affects more the evolution of the domestic 
GDP growth and inflation, whereas oil price shock affects more the domestic interest rate and the terms 
of trade. Further, the Global Financial Crisis raised inflation volatility.  
 
Obviously, the foreign monetary policy shock is one of the main instruments of financial channel of the 
transmission of external shocks. Houssa et al (2013, 2019) underline the role of credit shock and 
monetary policy shock on developing countries’ macroeconomic volatility. However, there is no stress 
on the possible role of unconventional monetary policy shock in macroeconomic volatility of developing 
countries during the crisis and post-crisis period. Megersa (2017, p63-110) explores how recent 
unconventional monetary policies in advanced economies impacted the returns on South African assets. 
Specifically, this study evaluates the effect of the joint announcement of unconventional monetary 
policies (UMP) applied by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) when the global 
financial crisis occurs, on South African Assets. Based on daily data from the Jan 01, 2007 to June 30, 
2016 period, this analysis considers besides the announcement of unconventional monetary policies 
(ECB and Fed), conventional local monetary policy [South African Central Reserve Bank (SARB) 
policy] as control variables. To estimate this impact, the paper applies an econometric model similar the 
one run in Fallagiarda et al. (2015), Fratzscher et al. (2016); Chen et al (2014) and Szczerbowicz 
(2015). This regression model captures how the variation of the return on a set of South African financial 
assets 9 is explained by the announcement of UMP10, the Fed Fund rate, the ECB’s policy rate, the SARB 
policy rate, the market volatility as well as the news and publication of relevant South African financial 
and macroeconomic data. 
 
The announcement of unconventional monetary policy such as QE is transmitted to South African Assets 
price & yield through four main channels, respectively the International Portfolio Rebalancing, 
Confidential, sovereign credit and credit bank channels. Regarding international portfolio channel, the 
results reveal that announcements of QE by the Fed have led to some financial inflows to SA equities 
and bonds. On the other hand, announcements of the contraction of QE program implied outflows, 
particularly in SA equities. In addition, the ECB’s publication of QE for asset purchases does not 
significantly affect South African Assets. The Liquidity provision program demonstrates a statistically 
significant inflow into SA bonds, whereas the collateral easing program notes some inflows to equities. 
However, the aggregate inflows or outflows on QE announcements (for both Fed and ECB) were small 
given the total foreign funds invested in South Africa (represent less than 1% of total foreign investments 
in SA’s financial assets).  
 
9 Financial assets are mainly based on the yield on bilateral exchange rates (Rand-USD and Rand-Euro), 
JSE stock market indices, 3 month interbank rate, sovereign bond yields of 5 and 10 years, credit default 
swap (CDS) of 5 and “10 years”; and foreign investment flows in to equities and bonds. 
10 The announcement of UMP is defined as Dummy variable which takes the value “1” on the days of 
announcement and “0” otherwise. 
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The results suggest that unconventional policies of the Fed have decreased on South African Sovereign 
Yields (5 years maturity) by 0.0535 percentage point. the ECB’s UMP announcement has decreased the 
SA Sovereign Yields (5 years maturity) by 0.0093 percentage point. Further, the UMP announcements 
induced overall appreciation of the domestic currency, reduction of sovereign bond yields and credit 
default swap (CDS) and increase in key stock market indices.  
It would be important for the paper to visit whether the Fed and ECB UMP have affected the SA real 
economy significantly (GDP, employment, etc.). To fill this gap, in our work, we will evaluate the way 
the unconventional monetary applied in G7 countries affected the South African and Nigerian real GDPs. 
 
The unconventional monetary policy can turn to capital inflows to developing countries. As found by 
Megersa (2017), the unconventional monetary policy applied by US and EU made the SA currency 
appreciate, this can have positive effect on attracting capital inflows. Thus, Mishra, Montiel, and 
Spilimbergo (2010) indicate that an economy driven under flexible exchange rate and open capital 
account can attract capital inflows through change in value of the exchange rate (uncovered interest parity 
condition). 
 
Bahmani and Toms (2015) remain in the same perspective of defining the possible role of 
unconventional monetary policy on capital inflows to developing countries. This paper evaluates the 
impact of quantitative easing applied by Federal Reserve, on the level of US foreign direct investment in 
Brazil, through ordinary least squares approach. The analysis has required the resort to control variables 
such as global national production, the official exchange of US dollars to Brazilian real and the domestic 
inflation rate. To measure quantitative easing, the authors used “total amount of the currency in US that 
is either circulating amongst the public or is in it’s the commercial bank deposits held by the federal 
reserve”. To conduct analysis, the paper used secondary annual data on the period 1982-2012. The results 
reveal that one percentage point increase in Brazilian Global National Product induces the FDI to increase 
by 0.40169%. The appreciation of Brazilian Real implies the FDI increase by 0.03537% and the raise of 
US quantitative easing by one percentage-point implies an improvement of 0.45523% of FDI to Brazil. 
However, one percentage point increase in inflation declines the FDI inflow by 0.01176%. 
 
The results of the authors respond to the theoretical expectations, but it would be important to integrate 
the capital openness indicator in order to see the role played by this indicator in attracting capital inflows. 
Linking Bahmani and Toms (2015) and Megersa (2017), it is crucial for the latter to capture the impact 
of UMP of Fed and ECB on SA real economy and visit the way capital inflows evolved after 
announcement of UMP (FDI and portfolio investment). 
 
To deal with domestic and foreign shock, governments and central banks conduct policies to respond 
effectively and maintain economic stability. For instance, different papers reported on the responses of 
countries during the recession of 2009. They indicate that to respond to the recession countries over the 
world have conducted countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies to bring their economies to steady 
state.  
 
Alam (2015) examines the effectiveness of the monetary policy in Bangladesh. This paper resorts to the 
Structural Vector Autoregression models with short run restrictions on the response of output, price and 
exchange rate to an exogenous monetary-policy Bangladesh.  
The analysis is conducted on quarterly data based on the period 1995-2011.  
 
It follows that an exogenous rise in the 3-month T-bill rate, the output starts falling from the 2nd quarter, 
the lowest level occurs around the 5th quarter. The effect starts disappearing after 10th quarter. The price 
declines on the 2nd quarter, improves on the third quarter to reach the high level on the 5th quarter. 
However, the increasing trend starts disappearing from the 10th quarter. Regarding the contractionary 
monetary policy, Taka rises against the USD starting from the 3rd quarter and the effect vanishes after 
the 14th quarter. In terms of variation in percentage point, there statistical significance, for all variables. 
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Hence, this explains though the variance decomposition that T-bill cannot explain percent of the short 
run changes of any of the variables. The authors stressed that prevalence of microcredit and government 
domestic borrowing might be the drivers of lack of effectiveness in monetary policy transmission. 
 
IMF (2010) analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy on SSA, based on bivariate regression, with 
the goal of identifying how changes in interest rate and money reserve impacted deposit and lending rate. 
Moreover, the paper analyzes the way the monetary policy affects output variables (economic growth, 
inflation, broad monetary aggregates and exchange rate) through VAR model using monthly data on the 
period 2000:1-2009:12. The IMF (2010) also disentangles the effect of monetary policy on countries 
with fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Once the African economy fell into recession, 
policymakers decreased quickly and significantly nominal interest rates. In some SSA countries, the 
recession has frozen the action commercial banks to decrease the lending rate, as the recession implies 
the increasing risk related to economic activities and the incentives for commercial banks to increase 
their profit margins. The lending rate did not decrease as much as the policy rate decreased in some SSA 
economies, but it follows the same trend as the policy rate.  
 
The results show that the connection from interest rates to economic activity and inflation are weaker. 
Nevertheless, the IMF found that in many sub-Saharan African countries, monetary transmission 
mechanism to real economy was constrained by different factors, respectively an excess liquidity in the 
financial system, weak development of financial markets, and substantial monetary policy financing of 
fiscal deficits (fiscal dominance). This result is similar to Alam (2015) statement, explaining that the lack of 
effectiveness of monetary policy in developing is explained by local economic and financial features. 
Borensztein, Darius and Kalemli-Ozcan (2019), summed up the assistance offered by the IMF to 
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, to deal with the spillover effects related to unconventional 
monetary policies implemented in most developed countries which can be noted through financial 
inflows to emerging and developing countries. To respond to unconventional monetary measures from 
advanced economies, Darius (2019) reports that the onset UMP restored stability of financial conditions 
and global demand induced by positive effect on South African capital inflows, but it also created 
dilemma in terms of policy to be implemented. Central Bank authorities decided not to apply any 
tightened monetary policy until they identify the effects of UMP on inflation pressures.  
 
Through this empirical review, we note that negative external shocks are harmful for small open 
economies, pointing the importance of commodity price and credit shocks in transmitting the global 
shocks. Moreover, in terms of responses to the recession almost responding developing countries applied 
countercyclical monetary measures and procyclical fiscal policy.  Overall, Houssa et al (2013, 2015 and 
2019) and Oladunni (2019) underline the important role plaid by the commodity price shock in 
transmitting foreign shocks to SA and Nigerian macroeconomic fluctuations using different models 
(BVAR and SOE-DSGE). Particularly the 4 papers emphasize the relevance of considering external 
shocks in explaining macroeconomic evolution in small open economy, as they all show the important 
role played by these shocks. Our research will complete these papers by capturing the impact of external 
and internal shocks (particularly during the 2009 recession) on SA and Nigeria (using narrative analysis); 
and evaluate whether the monetary policies applied by these countries were effective. Finally, using a 
regression model we will evaluate how the real economies of these two countries responded to 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter focuses on 2 essential points. First, the estimation of cyclic components of the output and 
financial variables through the Hodrick-Prescott filter and cross-correlation analysis we identify co-
movements between fundamental macroeconomic variables explaining the change in macroeconomic 
fluctuations of developing countries. Secondly, the conception of a regression model based on the shocks 
affecting developing economies as stated in our literature review (external and internal shocks).  
3.1. Estimation of business cycles of macroeconomic variables via HP Filter 
The point represents a crucial step in the process of macroeconomic shock analysis. The analysis of 
business cycle is relevant to evaluate and compare fluctuations and volatility of output variables in real 
terms (GPD, consumer price index, consumption, investment, government expenditures, trade and 
financial variables) across country. In fact, the business cycle analysis gives a picture on South African 
and Nigerian macroeconomic evolution and allows seeing in which country, macroeconomic factors were 
more volatile and which country has more persistent shocks in output. 
Each time series is composed of a seasonal component (captures all seasonal changes that may affect the 
variable), a trend component (long-term trend of the variable) and the business cycle (captures all of the 
fluctuations that have occurred in the time series). Mathematically, a time series can be presented as 
follows: 




Business cycles or cyclical components,y :
trend
t
y Long run trend or trend components: and 
season
t :seasonal componentsy  
In fact, before defining the business cycle of the series, we can seasonally adjust the time series using X-
13ARIMA-SEATS method through Macrobond. However, Hodrick-Prescott (1980, 1997) filter 
represents a mathematical tool applied to a series in order to capture cyclical component of a series, 
assuming that the trend component is smooth over time (Marcet and Ravn, 2003). To extract the cyclical 
component, we proceed by minimizing the following equation (2): 
 
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In the function (2), λ represents a positive fixed parameter penalizing the variance of the trend 
component, the higher will be the value of λ, and the smoother the trend component will be (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997). The value of λ depends up on the frequency of time series data under study. Hence, 
annual data require  be equal to100, quarterly data implies that = 1600 and for monthly data = 14400. 
The present research is based on quarterly data; this implies that the penalizing parameter of the variance 
of trend λ equals to 1600. 
The business cycle analysis will be associated to cross-correlation analysis. It is question of the co-
movement analysis between the GDP and trade and financial variables (Terms of trade, real credit, etc.). 
As the 2009 recession was transmitted to developing countries through trade and financial channels, it is 
important visit the wait the cyclical components of different variables are correlated to African countries’ 
GDP.  
 
3.2. Empirical studies and estimations 
The empirical studies consulted have underlined the main factor which explain the change in 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, the crisis from external origins is transmitted to developing world 
through trade and financial. Then we estimate a regression model build on external variables (financial, 
monetary policy and trade shocks) and internal variables (monetary policy, credit shock, etc.).  
Our model is based on three blocks, namely the international block (G7-countries), South African block 
and Nigerian block, to capture the effect of external shock on each country separately. Note that the 2 
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last blocks are small opened economies characterized by exports based on mining products and oil 
respectively.  
Moreover, this model is built on the assumptions that all external shocks coming from neighboring 
countries or from monetary and economic unions (which SA and Nigeria are part) are endogenous for 
Nigeria and South Africa, i.e these two countries do not respond to these shocks (Local cross-border 
shocks are endogenous). For instance, ECOWAS (Economic community of West African States) shocks 
are endogenous for Nigeria. SACU (Southern Africa Custom union) and SADC (Southern Africa 
Development Community) shocks are endogenous for South Africa. According to World Development 
Indicators11, South Africa represents on average 91,76% of SACU’s GDP in the period 2009-2019, while 
Nigeria represents 72% of ECOWAS’s GDP. Given the dominance of these countries at local level, we 
consider that both countries only respond to shocks originating from developed countries (especially G7 
countries) to maintain internal stability. This assumption pushes us to construct a model considering G7 
shocks and domestic shocks. 
In the spirit of Loayza and Raddatz (2006), Houssa et al (2013, 2015, 2019), Oladunni (2019) and 
Megersa (2017), we build a regression model assuming that the Nigerian and South African 
macroeconomic fluctuations are explained by domestic shocks (monetary policy, trade, credit supply, 
capital net flows, demand shocks12, commodity production shock, etc.) and foreign shocks originating 
from G7 countries (foreign monetary policy, foreign credit supply, demand and commodity price shocks). 
This model focuses on the financial and trade variables as variables of interest; they are assumed to be 
the main transmitters of the 2009 recession. Thus, the main purpose is to know the way the GDP was 
affected by the external shocks and the role played by the domestic monetary policy to sustain the 
economic stability. 
Further, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) consider the terms of trade as a driver of external shocks to GDP 
in emerging markets. In Houssa et al (2013, 2015, 2019), domestic and global productivity shock, credit 
supply shock, monetary policy, trade (terms of trade and trade in volume), demand shock, etc. mainly 
explain the change in macroeconomic volatility in South Africa. For Oladunni (2019), the oil price and 
global demand play an important role in the change of GDP of small opened oil exporting country. 
The model framing is inspired from Megersa (2017), his model stated the way interbank rate, security 
prices, return on assets and return on bilateral exchange rate responded to announcement of 
unconventional monetary policy in US and EU. This empirical model is presented as follows: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛾1∆𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛾2∆𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐴 + 𝜃1∆𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3) 
With Yt assets price and returns, UMPt
F the announcement of unconventional monetary policy (by Fed 
and ECB), IRtF the foreign policy rate (Fed fund and ECB interest rate), IRSA, MKTVolatility the 
financial market volatility and News are news on macroeconomic indicators. We derive from this model 
the following one which captures GDP responses to the change in internal and external variables: 
















+ 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
With Y = GDP, UMP the unconventional monetary policy applied in G7 countries to cushion the effects 
of the global recession. This variable takes the value 1 for all period where this policy was applied to 
alleviate the 2009 recession and 0 for other periods. IR G7 represents the average of interest rates of G7 
countries (average shadow rates including the application of UMP) and IR SA/NIG are the policy rate 
fixed by SARB and CBN. RC represents the real credit in developed countries (G7) and South 
 
11 GDP constant price (2010=100) 
12 Domestic Demand shocks are related to all shocks happened in household consumption, government 
spending and investment. 
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Africa/Nigeria. NCF refers to the net capital flow to domestic economy, CP13 represent the commodity 
price on world market, TOT is the domestic terms of trade and EV is the export volume. Finally, CRISIS 
refers the periods when the global financial crisis started hitting Nigeria and South Africa turning to 
recession. It takes the value 1 for all period 2009. The crisis started showing drastic effects on developed 
countries in the fourth quarter of 2008 and overflows to emerging and developing economies with some 
lags. CRISIS takes value 0 for other periods. 
In the above-mentioned model, the partial domestic demand shock (government final consumption, 
investment and household final consumption) and the production shock were not integrated owing to the 
possible endogeneity problem between these variables and the output (the co-movement analysis will be 
used to see whether GDP and commodity production followed the same trend. It is crucial to cross the 
monetary policy rate with the crisis variable to see the way the shift to the recession made the policy rate 
affect the GDP. We can also cross the shadow rate with UMP to see the way GDP was affected during 
the recession by the shadow rate during the unconventional monetary policy phase.  
The model will be: 
 
















+ 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
Particularly, Megersa (2017) details information on the announcement and application of 
unconventional monetary policy in US and EU from the last quarter of 2008 to 2017, we use this 
information to build the variable UMP. Thus, the lack of robustness of the economic growth after the 
onset of the first unconventional monetary policy, pushed developed economies to apply the UMP in 
different phases to reach the sustained economic recovery (see the Table 1). Episodes of UMP can be 
resumed in the following table: 
Tableau 1 Phases of UMP in United States and Euro-zone 
Periods Fed ECB 
4th quarter 2008-2009 QE1 CE 
2010-2011 QE2 CE 
2012-2014 QE3 CE 
2015-2016 - QE 
Source: Author’s compilation 
  
3.3.   Data and adjustments 
To construct data for the present research, we use different data sources namely the IMF financial data, 
World Development Indicators data, Reserve Bank of New Zealand and national resources (CBN, 
 
13 For Nigeria, oil price is considered as commodity price of reference, owing to its influence on the 
Nigerian economy. While for SA, commodity price is framed from simple average of world prices of the 
main miming exported by South Africa (coal, platinum, silver and aluminum) as specified by Houssa et 
al (2019). Due to data availability we use the metals except gold price index like a proxy for mining 
products price index. We also apply the food world price index for both countries. 
 
P a g e  | 33 
Nigerian Institution of statistics, SARB and SA statistics institution). Hence, quarterly 14 series are 
considered to evaluate the evolvement of these economies for the 1995-2019, cancelling the previous 
periods dominated by low openness of South Africa to global economy due to the Apartheid. These data 
are related to domestic and foreign blocks: 
3.3.1. Foreign block 
This block is mainly focused on data related to the following variables: 
 The shadow rates 
Wu and Xia (2016), explain that during the crisis central banks interest rate in developed countries were 
on zero-lower bound and the quantitative easing was applied to sustain interest rates cut. They suggest 
capturing the quantitative easing through interest rate, hence they built negative interest rates called 
shadow rates reflecting the amplitude of quantitative easing applied in advanced countries. Concerning 
G7, we use monthly shadow rates data from the University of Chicago (United Kingdom shadow rate on 
Macrobond) and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand14 (US, Euro-zone, Japan, and Canada shadow rates), 
which we transformed in quarterly data. This information on G7 countries allows building an average 
shadow rate for G7 countries. 
 The real credit  
To measure real credit in G7 countries, we use data from World Bank on world development indicators. 
We consider the aggregate value of domestic credit to private sector (in % of gdp) in G7, which are 
transformed to quarterly data using Chow & Li interpolation from Matlab. We used aggregate G7 GDP 
(in US dollars) in quarterly data to interpolate the real credit, assuming that the GDP can predict the real 
credit to private sector. All variables expressed in USD are transformed in local currencies, to facilitate 
uniformity. 
 World commodity price indexes (2016=100) 
We use monthly data on world commodity prices constant price (2016=100), transformed in quarterly 
data for analysis goal (these data are found on the IMF Commodity Data Portal)15. The commodity prices 
concerned are Food price index, all metals excluding gold price index and the crude oil price index; 
there are considered as the main commodity prices which affected the Sub-Saharan economies during 
the downturn of 2009 as their exports are based on primary food and mining products (minerals and oil). 
3.3.2. Domestic block 
The domestic block is based on 2 panels (SA and Nigeria) and consider the following variables: GDP, 
CPI, Net capital flows, government consumption, credit supply, policy rate, lending rate, exports in 
volume, term of trade, export, import. All domestic variables are expressed in local currencies (SA in 
Zar and Nigeria in Naïra). 
a. South Africa 
 GDP and its components (2010=100) 
Data on SA GDP and its components constant price (2010=100) are found from macrobond. These 
quarterly data on real GDP, real government expenditure, real exports and real imports are seasonally 
adjusted.  
The Real Consumer price index (2010=100) in quarterly data found from IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). The nominal exchange rate in daily data were converted into quarterly and seasonally 
adjusted (data from macrobond). Finally, the production of metals in tons (crude steel) as a proxy for 
primary commodity production (the minerals are the important primary commodity exported by the SA).  
 Terms of trade constant price (2010=100) 
Using macrobond as a bridge, we found quarterly data on Terms of trade seasonally adjusted from South 
African Reserve and South African Statistics. The export volume index (2000=100) from World 
 
14 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research-and-publications/research-
programme/additional-research/measures-of-the-stance-of-united-states-monetary-policy/comparison-
of-international-monetary-policy-measures    
15 IMF Commodity Portal: https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices 
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Development Index (WDI) in yearly data was interpolated based on exports from Southern African 
countries (South Africa & BLNS16). 
 Financial variables 
First, monthly data on Claims on private sector, transformed in quarterly data and seasonally adjusted 
(data from SARB). Second, quarterly data on policy rate, lending and deposit rates from IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS); the net portfolio investment in quarterly is seasonally adjusted 
(from SARB). Finally, the foreign direct investment in % of GDP (annual data from World Bank 
Dataset). The FDI in % of GDP is converted to quarterly data through Chow & Li tool, referring to 
quarterly data of nominal exchange rate (expressed in US dollars). The idea of this perspective is that the 
appreciation of exchange rate attracts more FDI inflows, reason why the exchange rate is used to predict 
the FDI in quarterly data. 
b. Nigeria  
 GDP and its components (2010=100) 
GDP and its components are annual (data from National Bureau of Statistics via macrobond), we applied 
Chow and Li interpolation to convert them into quarterly data. Considering that the Nigerian economy 
relies on the oil activities. Thus, we used Crude oil price/Bonny Light in Naïra (monthly data converted 
to quarterly and seasonally adjusted through macrobond) to interpolate GDP and its components. The 
quarterly Real Consumer price index (2010=100) from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). The 
daily nominal exchange rate is converted to quarterly and seasonally adjusted (data from macrobond). 
We use the production of crude oil and other liquids (in barrels/day) to approximatively measure the 
production of primary commodity, assuming that all commodity production followed the same trend after 
the onset of the recession.  
 Trade variables 
The real exports (2010=10) in annual are converted to quarterly data through Chow & Li tool, referring 
the nominal exchange rate. The depreciation of exchange rate can have positive effect on the level of 
exports. For the real imports (2010=100), it is interpolated by using consumer price index as a 
benchmark. Moreover, monthly commodity terms of trade data from IMF data converted to quarterly for 
analytic purpose. For the export volume, we use the export volume index from WDI. Monthly data from 
Energy Information Administration on Nigeria Petroleum & Other Liquids Production (valued in 
Barrels/day; transformed to quarterly and seasonally adjusted) are used to interpolate the export of crude 
oil in volume. 
 Financial variables 
First, monthly M3 broad money (from Central Bank of Nigeria via macrobond) converted to quarterly 
and seasonally. Second, real credit represented by domestic credit on private sector (in % of gdp) which 
is transformed to quarterly data through Chow & Li tool, referring to quarterly M3. The idea is that the 
increase of broad money can predict the improvement of domestic credit. Third, quarterly data on 
monetary policy rate, the lending and deposit rates from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Finally, net FDI and net portfolio investment in % GDP (annual) are interpolated using the nominal 













16 BLNS is an abbreviation for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (Eswatini). 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1.  Co-movement and business cycle analysis of South Africa and Nigeria 
4.1.1. Co-movement between real GDP and Price level  
The co-movement analysis of the GDP and price reveals that the South African Economy was dominated 
by aggregate supply chocks given the negative co-movement between the GDP and Price (1995: q1-
2019: q4). The pre-recession period shows high amplitudes in the fluctuations of GDP and Price, while 
the post-recession period, the economy become more stable. In the recession of 2009, the GDP growth 
decrease by 8 percentage points and the inflation increased by 5 percentage points. The mechanism 
behind is that, when the world commodity price declined, this pushed the supply of primary commodity 
to decline as the exporting price dropped. Moreover, the lack of commodity supply on domestic South 
African market increases the price level and decline in local demand, which finally turns to a decline of 
GDP. This explains why the recession was associated to an increase of inflation in South African 
economy as it was related to supply shock. The cross-correlation coefficient of -0,6611 (Appendix 1) 
reveals that the consumer price index is countercyclical. It is also leading the South African GDP at Lag 
4. Nigeria presents a reverse situation, the right part of the figure below shows that the pre-recession 
period was dominated by aggregate demand shocks, given the positive co-movement between the GDP 
and the inflation. However, in the post-recession one can see the dominance of aggregate supply shocks. 
Overall, Nigerian economy was dominated by aggregate demand shocks, it can be seen through the 
positive cross-correlation coefficient 0,3157 (Appendix 1) between the GDP growth and the inflation. 
This explain a part why the Nigerian economy faces high inflationary pressures in the pre-recession 
period compared to South Africa, as one can see in the graph below:  
 
Figure 21 Co-movement between the real gross domestic product and the consumer price index 
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4.1.2. Central banks efficiency and Banking system 
A. Central banks and commercial banks interest rates 
IMF (2010) states that the efficiency of the central bank can be seen through the way the banking system 
respond to central bank bank’s action on policy rate and how the real economy reacts to the change in 
the banking system lending rate. Through the figure below one can see the way central policy rate evolved 
compared to lending rate in the two countries: 
Figure 22 Co-movement between the central bank policy rate and lending rate 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
The left part of the above-mentioned graph shows the way the South African baking system perfectly 
react to central bank adjustment, this situation exposes that SARB is effective in controlling commercial 
banks as the policy rate and lending rate follow perfectly the same trend. On the right part, the Nigerian 
banking system has some difficulties to proportionally follow the policy rate change. IMF (2010) 
explains that some Sub-Saharan banking systems face constraints to perfectly adjust the lending rate to 
the monetary policy rate due the increase of risk during meltdown periods and the pursuit of high margin 
of profits. Overall, through the figure above, we can note that the SARB is more effective in influencing 
the change in lending rate of commercial banks than the CBN. The Nigerian economy is hugely 
dependant on crude oil price, all shocks in crude oil price are directly linked with Nigerian economic 
crisis. Take for instance the commodity price shock of 2009 and the oil shock of 2016 turned to recession, 
for these periods the change in lending rate were smaller than the change in policy rate, this shows the 
rigidity of commercial banks to adjusted lending cut to policy rate change. The South African commercial 
banks’ lending rate is perfectly positively co-moved to SARB’s policy rate at lag 0 (0,9835). However, 
for Nigeria the cross-correlation result of -0,2915 at lag 2, shows a negative co-movement between the 
monetary policy rate and the lending rate (Appendix 2). This means, that during the meltdown, 
commercial banks increase the lending rate, given the intensification of risk related to real activity or 
keep the lending constant while the policy rate has declined. At the end the private sector will have get 
difficulty to have credit access.   
B. Central banks and domestic credit to private sector 
The absence of financial markets in developing countries pushes the central bank to lean the lending 
channel. The goal for the central bank to adjust the policy rate during the crisis, is to ease access of private 
sector to credit. The increase of domestic credit to depend on the way commercial banks are flexible to 
follow central bank adjustments. The following figure shows the way the policy rate and real credit cycle 
evolved in SA and Nigeria: 
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Figure 23 Co-movement between Central Bank policy rate and domestic credit to private sector  
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
On the left part of the figure above, one can note that the domestic credit to South African private sector 
is countercyclical, i.e any decrease (or increase) of policy rate is associated to an increase (or decrease) 
of private credit. with negative cross-correlation coefficient of 0,3563 at lag 2, meaning that domestic 
credit responds to the policy rate cut after 2 quarters in South Africa. Regarding the Nigeria, the result 
shows that le domestic credit to private sector is leading the change in policy rate, with negative 
correlation of -0,3568 at lag 4 (Appendix 3). In the 2009 recession, the fluctuations in policy rate and 
domestic credit present high amplitude compared to other periods meaning that this shock was among 
the greatest crisis faced by these countries.  The onset of this crisis first declines the level of domestic 
credit to private sector for the both countries; the expansionary monetary policy applied by SA and 
Nigeria in the first quarter of 2009 made some improvements in the domestic credit to private sector. 
Particularly, in the post-recession the Nigerian domestic credit to private sector increased more than the 
one of SA.  According to the Article IV consultation staff report IMF on Nigeria of 2014, public and 
private sector relies more on domestic debts than external debts, as the lending rate remained slightly 
rigid even when the policy rate increased (from 2011 to 2015). 
The idea is to see whether the local monetary policy is capable to improve funding of private sector, the 
negative linkage identified between the policy rate and the domestic credit to private sector displays the 
possible existing effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize economic activity. Any expansionary 
monetary policy is associated to improvement in credit growth. The case of Nigeria let us skeptical 
regarding the fact that the domestic credit to private sector is leading the policy rate why, it could be the 
reverse as the policy ate is the exogenous factor adjusted to improve credit access. In this sense, the lack 
of access to credit always push CBN to cut interest rate for easing liquidity access.  
4.2. Determinants of macroeconomic fluctuations in South Africa and Nigeria 
during the crisis 
Different authors found that the recession was related transmitted to Sub-Saharan African countries 
through the trade and financial channel. Based on co-movement analysis, we evaluate shapes of the GDP 
growth and different financial and trade factors to capture which business is more similar to GDP cycle. 
4.2.1. Transmission of crisis through trade channel 
Food price and metal price (except gold) index were the main transmitters of external commodity shock 
during the 2009 recession on South Africa, while Nigeria was affected through food and crude oil prices. 
Moreover, terms of trade display the effect of external trade on domestic policy, the higher the terms of 
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trade, the higher the entry of foreign currency.  The figure below highlights the way GDPs of African 
countries co-moved to different trade parameter: 
Figure 24 GDP, Commodity price and Terms of trade 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
On the left side of the figure above, we can see the approximation of GDP growth shape, food price and 
terms of trade cycles. The 2009 and 2016 crises are related to commodity price shocks, show a huge 
decline in metal price as the shocks led the drop of raw materials price. This figure displays that all 
positive and negative changes in GDP are linked to the proportional change in food price, metal price 
and terms of trade. Regarding the amplitude of business cycles, the metal price presents high volatility 
compared to other external parameters. However, in 2000, 2003 and 4th quarter of 2019, we note a 
negative co-movement between the GDP growth and the metal price, while the terms of trade and food 
price are closed to South African GDP cycle for all study period (1995: q1- 2019: q4). This situation let 
us understand that the fluctuations in GDP cycle is more related to food price and terms of trade. The 
cross-correlation coefficients of 0,5443 (at lag 1), 0,6903 (at lag 3) and 0,3360 (at lag 4) show 
respectively the procyclicality of food price, metal price and terms of trade. They are leading the change 
in GDP business cycle. Particularly, in the graph one can notice that the metal price shock has at a certain 
level contributed to the 2009 recession in South Africa. 
Moreover, the change in Nigerian GDP business cycle is approximatively similar to variations of cycles 
of food price, crude oil price and terms of trade. Regarding the cross-correlation of 0,16203 (at lag 2), -
0,3513 (at lag 4) and 0,1125 (at lag 4), we can note the crude oil price is countercyclical for this study 
period, while other external variables are procyclical (Appendix 4). The expectation was to see a 
procyclical linkage, this shows that all shocks in GDP are not related to crude oil price shocks. The two 
recent recession in Nigeria (2009 and 2016) were mainly associated to the decline in crude oil price. 
Further, IMF (2010) found that the global recession was also transmitted through the drop of exports in 
volume. The graph below displays the way the exports in volume are co-moved the GDP growth: 
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Figure 25 Co-movement between the GDP and the export volume index 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
During the pre-recession period, the high decline in export volume of South Africa was equal to 6 
percentage points (left of the graph). However, the onset of the global recession made the volume of 
exports drop by 19 percentage points. As a small opened exporting country, the decline in export volume 
drastically contributed to pave the road of recession in South Africa. In the post-recession period, the 
export volume index became less volatile. The cross-correlation coefficient of 0,563 (at lag 1) shows a 
positive co-movement between the GDP and the export volume index of SA (the export volume is leading 
the change GDP cycle). For Nigerian case (right side), we can see that all important declines of export 
volume index were associated to decline of GDP growth (especially in 2009 & 2016, etc.). Overall, the 
correlation analysis shows (0,4511 at lag 3) a positive co-movement between the GDP and the export 
volume index in Nigeria, this means that the change in Nigeria GDP can be also explained by the 
variations of the volume of exports (Appendix 5). In 2009, the export volume index declined by 12 
percentage points while in SA it was equal to 19 percentage points. The situation starts give light on the 
reasons why South Africa faced a high decline of GDP compared to Nigeria, as this country faced more 
decline in exports. 
As we can see the 2 last graphs, the decline of GDP in 2009 was linked to the drop of commodity prices, 
terms of trade and export volume index. Thus, the regression analysis will further clarify which variable 
explains significantly the change in Sub-Saharan African GDPs. 
4.2.2. Transmission of crisis through financial channel 
Different empirical studies sustain that recession from external origin (especially developed countries) 
has negative impact on capital inflows to developing countries (decline in FDI, investment portfolio, 
foreign aids, remittances, etc.). Referring to the statistics of IMF (2009 & 2010), the recession did not 
affect the inflow of remittances and foreign aids to Sub-Saharan Africa, reason why for the analysis of 
financial channel, we build on the net inflow of FDI and portfolio investment. The following figure 
highlights the way the GDP and capital net inflows co-moved in 1995 – 2019: 
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Figure 26 Co-movement between the GDP and the financial channel 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
For the both countries, business cycles of net inflows present numerous fluctuations compared the GDPs, 
this means that all declines in capital net inflow are in all cases linked to the drop of GDP. As we can see 
in the 2 parts of the graph, in 2009, the FDI net inflow increased, while the expectation was to see it 
decline due the financial crisis. However, the net portfolio investment net inflow has declined in 2009. 
Hence, it remains skeptical to conclude whether capital net inflows have affected the GDP growth during 
meltdown period. 
4.2.3. The role of domestic channel in GDP change: commodity supply in tons & Barrels/day 
To quantify the commodity supply, we used the for each countries the production of the important 
primary commodity exported. For South Africa, we took crude iron production (in tons) as a proxy of 
mining products and for Nigeria we used crude oil and other liquids production (in barrels/day). The 
South African and Nigerian economies were hit by an aggregate supply shock during the crisis (2009). 
Thus, the mechanism is that the crisis made the world commodity price declines, which in turn pushed 
the suppliers to drop production, as the production collapsed, the price level increased on the local market. 
In the regression model, the commodity supply was not integrated due the problem of endogeneity 
between the GDP and the commodity supply (what is causing what). The figure resumes the evolution 
of GDP versus the commodity supply: 
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Figure 27 Co-movement between the GDP and the commodity supply 
 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
All periods of negative shocks on the production of primary commodities are associated the important 
drops in GDP. From 2008 to 2009, the mining production declined from 18 percentage points to -45 
percentage points, while the Nigerian Crude oil and other liquid production moved from 1 to -9 
percentage points. The way the important primary commodity exported declined in South Africa 
compared to Nigeria, continue displaying why the recession has more effect on South Africa than 
Nigeria. Employments and sectors depending mining production were exposed to be drastically shaken. 
The cross-correlation of 0,2881 (at lag 2) shows a positive co-movement between the SA GDP growth 
and mining production, i.e the positive or negative change in mining production is linked to the similar 
change in GDP (Appendix 6). The Nigerian GDP growth and production of crude oil and other liquids 
are positively linked (0,2536 at lag 3). Finally, one can say the decline of GDPs in SA and Nigeria during 
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4.3.  Understanding the impact of monetary policy during the 2009 recession 
To analyze the impact of CBN and SARB policy on the GDPs, we also consider other variables which 
can explain the macroeconomic fluctuations in Sub-Saharan countries for control. Indeed, the control 
variables are built on external monetary policy, financial and trade channels. 




SOUTH AFRICA NIGERIA 


















Ln Policy rate 
  
 -
0.562***  0.0547* 
-
0.0514*** -0.0507** -0.637*** -0.276*** 0.00483 -0.123    
(-17.73)           (2.32) (-3.55) (-3.09) (-4.63) (-6.42) (0.21) (-1.96)    
Ln real domestic 
credit 
  
  0.647*** 0.184* 0.266**   0.0802* 0.0431* 0.0384    
  (20.41) (2.66) (3.41)   (2.30) (2.63) (1.44)    




0.0585*** -0.0157* -0.0228*   -0.0336* 
-
0.0364*** -0.0276*   
  (-5.21) (-2.04) (-2.67)   (-2.18) (-5.65) (-2.53)    
Ln G7 real credit 
  
  0.00403 0.129*** 0.0979**   0.507*** 0.299*** 0.368*** 
  (0.19) (5.83) (3.54)   (11.84) (7.25) (4.83)    
Ln Food price 
  
    0.337*** 0.345***     0.153* 0.00390    
    (5.09) (4.57)     (2.07) (0.03)    
Ln Metal price 
  
    0.0299 -0.00948                       
    (0.66) (-0.20)                       
Ln Crude oil price 
  
            
-
0.0899*** 0.0394    
            (-3.87) (0.42)    
Ln Terms of trade 
  
    0.146 0.0536     1.478*** 0.792    
    (1.96) (0.72)     (7.90) (1.59)    
Ln export volume 
index 
  
    0.0455 0.0895     -0.0721* -0.123    
    (0.79) (1.35)     (-2.35) (-1.89)    
Ln net portfolio 
investment 
  
      0.00544       0.00356    
      (1.74)       (1.16)    
 Ln net FDI       -0.000116        -0.0179 
       (-0.02)       (-0.81) 
Constant 29.71***        9.619*** 16.57*** 15.46*** 31.60*** 10.28*** 11.47*** 13.22*** 
  (423.07)          (12.87) (11.02) (9.51) (89.95) (11.67) (12.81) (6.72)    
                  
N 100 57 57 37 100 57 57 27 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: Author’s estimation through Stata 
The model without control shows the significant positive impact of expansionary monetary policy on 
GDP growth over time for SA and Nigeria. For any policy rate cut of 1%, the GDP increase by 0.562% 
and 0.637% in respectively South Africa and Nigeria. After control, one can see that when the policy rate 
decreases by 1%, GDPs increase by 0.0507% and 0.123% for SA & Nigeria (the impact is not significant 
for Nigeria). Monetary and credit shocks have exerted significant effect on GDPs. Thus, improvement in 
domestic credit to private sector push the GDP to increase by 0.266% in SA and 0.0384% in Nigeria (the 
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impact is not significant). The shadow rate affects negatively the GDP meaning that the decline of shadow 
rates in G7 countries has made GDPs increase by 0.0228% & 0.0276% in SA and Nigeria. The credit 
shock in G7 has made the GDP increase by 0.0979% and 0.368% in respectively SA and Nigeria. Further, 
among trade and financial variables, Food price exerts significant and positive impact on South African 
GDP (0.345%). But for Nigeria the impact of the trade variables seems not to be significant. However, 
excluding financial channel in the model, the food price, the terms of trade, crude oil price and the export 
volume have a significant impact on Nigerian GDP. Over time the regression can show possible 
insignificant impact of trade and financial channels, but as one can see the co-movement analysis these 
two channels have played important role in GDP cycle during the period of recession. 
One can cross the policy rate with crisis binary variable to visit the way changes of policy rate affected 
the GDP during the recession, knowing that the policy rate holds 0 value in the other periods. In addition, 
the shadow rate can also be crossed with the unconventional monetary policy (binary variable), to see 
whether the change in shadow rate affected GDPs of sub-Saharan countries. The table below shows the 
way the GDP reacted to monetary policies during the crisis: 




SOUTH AFRICA NIGERIA 


















Ln Policy rate*Crisis 
  
0.0551            0.187 -0.0184 0.0313 0.0968 -0.0941 0.172** 0.176*   
(0.88)          (1.61) (-0.30) (1.86) (0.90) (-0.48) (2.98) (2.48)    
Ln real domestic credit 
  
  0.569*** 0.270** 0.461***   0.252*** 0.00812 0.00138    
  (18.37) (2.94) (4.25)   (7.00) (0.44) (0.05)    
Ln G7 shadow rate*UMP 
  
  0.266 -0.0253 0.00   -0.125 0.216* 0.218*   
  (1.45) (-0.26) (.)   (-0.43) (2.53) (2.15)    
Ln G7 real credit 
  
  0.0535* 0.151*** 0.0617   0.369*** 0.421*** 0.406*** 
  (2.48) (5.79) (1.51)   (7.41) (11.15) (5.20)    
Ln Food price 
  
    0.353*** 0.495***     0.254** 0.235    
    (4.59) (4.93)     (3.45) (1.59)    
Ln Metal price 
  
    0.00912 -0.120                       
    (0.16) (-1.81)                       
Ln Crude oil price 
  
            
-
0.128*** -0.0793    
            (-5.07) (-0.82)    
Ln Terms of trade 
  
    0.129 -0.132     1.395*** 1.270*   
    (1.32) (-1.24)     (6.62) (2.44)    
Ln export volume index 
  
    -0.0254 0.230     
-
0.126*** -0.132    
    (-0.35) (2.04)     (-4.04) (-1.88)    
Ln net portfolio investment 
  
      0.00777       0.00221    
      (1.59)       (0.61)    
 Ln net FDI  
      -0.0136       -0.00535    
      (-1.57)       (-0.21)    
Constant 
28.48***         10.31*** 13.66*** 11.17*** 29.97*** 9.754*** 8.443*** 9.675*** 
(1079.25)         (17.07) (7.02) (5.04) (694.78) (9.59) (11.35) (5.04)    
N 100 57 57 37 100 57 57 27 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Source: Author’s estimation through Stata 
In the model without control, change from non-recession period to 2009 recession, made the policy rate 
increase the SA GDP by 0.0551% (insignificant impact) and the Nigerian GDP by 0.176%. During the 
conduction of unconventional monetary policy, the shadow rate did not affect the SA GDP, while it has 
significant impact on Nigerian GDP (0.218%). Foreign and domestic credit impact on GDPs remain 
robust in this model with UMP. Among financial and trade channel variables, only food price and terms 
of trade have impacted positively SA and Nigerian GDPs (0.495% and 1.270% respectively). 
Particularly, one can note that the crude oil price and metal price (except gold) has exerted insignificant 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Here we are at the end of our work entitled “understanding the impact and policy of African Central 
Banks during the recent recession”. 
The purpose of this work was to capture the impact of the 2009 recession crisis, assess the factors 
explaining it and find the role played by domestic and external monetary policy within the economy. Co-
movement analysis and ordinary least squares achieved this goal. 
Indeed, starting from the model without control, domestic monetary policy exerts a positive influence on 
South Africa and Nigeria. The results reveal that any 1% reduction in the policy rate, South African and 
Nigerian GDP increases by 0.562% and 0.637% respectively. Including credit shock, external monetary 
policy, trade and financial channel variables as control; internal and external credit shocks exert a positive 
influence on the level of GDP in both countries. This ties in with the ideas put forward by Houssa et al 
(2013, 2015) highlighting the positive impact of the credit shock from G7 on South Africa and Ghana. 
These authors have mentioned that the shock on credit and trade are the transmitters of the external 
shocks on developing countries. This can be seen in our results, given the fact that in addition to monetary 
policy shock, the credit shock and certain trade factors have impacted the South African and Nigerian 
economy (Food price, oil price, terms of trade, etc.).  
Our results show that the financial channel variables did not exert a significant influence on GDP in both 
countries. This prompts us to point out that macroeconomic fluctuations in Nigeria and South Africa are 
generally influenced by monetary policy shocks, credit shocks and the trade channel. Oladunni (2019) 
underlined the importance of oil shock in Nigeria; as our result reveals, the crude oil price exerted 
negative impact on GDP, meaning that it is important for Nigeria to keep its economy more and more 
independent from crude oil (this was among suggestions of IMF consultancy team to Nigerian 
government for stabilization policy).  
In addition, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) mentioned the importance of FDI in GDP fluctuation, in our 
analysis on SA and Nigeria the impact of net capital inflows on GDP was found to be insignificant. 
Megersa (2017) found a negative impact of unconventional monetary policy on assets yields in SA, our 
results show that the UMP has no impact on SA GDP. However, the impact was noted positive on 
Nigerian GDP. 
Finally, the domestic monetary policy during the recession of 2009, the monetary policy of the SARB 
did not exert a significant influence on South African GDP (0.0313%) while the Nigerian monetary 
policy led to a significant increase of 0.176% of GDP. Further, the GDPs have responded positively to 
the change in external monetary policy. Overall, the co-movement analysis and regression results expose 
the impact of monetary policy shock, credit shock and trade channel shocks. For financial channel, co-
movement analysis has shown that the shape of business cycles of capital net inflows does not correspond 
to GDP cycle, meaning that all changes in financial channels don’t turn into the change in GDP. The 
regression result also points out the insignificant impact of the financial channel on the GDP/.  
This methodology applied in the paper is for time reason, but the most appropriate methodology would 
be the historical decomposition in SVAR model to see the contribution of each shock to GDP. Moreover, 
the counterfactual analysis in SVAR model could allow us to clearly identify the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in the GDP. The plan is to perform in the future the same subject by applying the 
appropriate methodology underlined. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 Cross-correlation between GDP and CPI 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Lag GDP cycle   CPI cycle  P-Value GDP cycle P-Value CPI cycle 
Lag 0 
1 -0,374543703 0 0,000123501 
-0,374543703 1 0,000123501 0 
Lag 1 
0,75853607 -0,497490497 9,60E-20 1,62E-07 
-0,232803104 0,950191004 0,020400369 6,57E-51 
Lag 2 
0,632551667 -0,599438106 2,81E-12 6,97E-11 
-0,082238655 0,8218134 0,420796355 3,46E-25 
Lag 3 
0,528001755 -0,659043259 2,73E-08 2,16E-13 
0,051503591 0,642392914 0,616365192 1,32E-12 
Lag 4 
0,336901644 -0,661073799 0,000789658 2,30E-13 
0,148582545 0,432049761 0,148523017 1,11E-05 
NIGERIA 
Lag GDP cycle   CPI cycle  P-Value GDP cycle P-Value CPI cycle 
Lag 0 
1 0,261543803 0 0,008576846 
0,261543803 1 0,008576846 0 
Lag 1 
0,962397855 0,279605493 1,05E-56 5,07E-03 
0,300985563 0,90059799 0,002467806 7,11E-37 
Lag 2 
0,858001037 0,279348377 1,58E-29 5,34E-03 
0,314568236 0,660197128 0,001607182 1,42E-13 
Lag 3 
0,704057183 0,250241385 8,66E-16 1,34E-02 
0,315712391 0,408125938 0,001632282 3,33E-05 
Lag 4 
0,518553579 0,192825779 6,24E-08 5,98E-02 
0,314631215 0,218706274 0,001795939 3,23E-02 
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Appendix 2 Cross-correlation between policy rate and lending rate 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Lag Policy rate cycle   Lending rate cycle  P-Value Policy rate cycle   p-value Lending rate cycle 
Lag 0 
1 0,983560473 0 1,16E-74 
0,983560473 1 1,16E-74 0 
Lag 1 
0,887454377 0,88165514 2,13E-34 2,11E-33 
0,858235172 0,871805598 7,49E-30 7,98E-32 
Lag 2 
0,653699457 0,658735363 2,94E-13 1,67E-13 
0,618707883 0,633692433 1,13E-11 2,50E-12 
Lag 3 
0,411024975 0,417749126 2,89E-05 2,07E-05 
0,374554936 0,386787457 0,000157033 9,10E-05 
Lag 4 
0,198431787 0,200321244 5,26E-02 5,04E-02 
0,16457705 0,166634187 0,109079886 1,05E-01 
NIGERIA 
Lag Policy rate cycle   Lending rate cycle  P-Value Policy rate cycle   p-value Lending rate cycle 
Lag 0 
1 -0,0035563 0 9,72E-01 
-0,0035563 1 9,72E-01 0 
Lag 1 
0,765099056 -0,217901702 3,00E-20 3,03E-02 
0,158881263 0,820691086 1,16E-01 2,58E-25 
Lag 2 
0,491571185 -0,291505267 2,75E-07 3,59E-03 
0,230470677 0,588330632 2,24E-02 1,89E-10 
Lag 3 
0,17366026 -0,266571495 8,89E-02 8,31E-03 
0,27252938 0,324240408 0,006920846 1,20E-03 
Lag 4 
-0,094034223 -0,222654693 3,62E-01 2,92E-02 
0,238789584 0,0523842 0,019129126 6,12E-01 
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Appendix 3 Cross-correlation between policy rate and Domestic credit to private sector 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Lag Policy rate cycle   Domestic credit cycle 
 P-Value Policy rate 
cycle   P-Value Domestic credit cycle 
Lag 0 
1 -0,315649556 0 1,38E-03 
-0,315649556 1 1,38E-03 0 
Lag 1 
0,887454377 -0,245787285 2,13E-34 1,42E-02 
-0,346712772 0,956114448 4,39E-04 1,63E-53 
Lag 2 
0,653699457 -0,126228617 2,94E-13 2,16E-01 
-0,356398557 0,833162734 3,16E-04 1,95E-26 
Lag 3 
0,411024975 0,039551575 2,89E-05 7,01E-01 
-0,354483295 0,651703249 0,000367463 4,86E-13 
Lag 4 
0,198431787 0,237587978 5,26E-02 1,98E-02 
-0,340818023 0,438368256 0,000679031 7,93E-06 
NIGERIA 
Lag Policy rate cycle   Domestic credit cycle 
 P-Value Policy rate 
cycle   P-Value Domestic credit cycle 
Lag 0 
1 -0,202783373 0 4,30E-02 
-0,202783373 1 4,30E-02 0 
Lag 1 
0,765099056 -0,257668091 3,00E-20 1,00E-02 
-0,13112153 0,962589356 1,96E-01 8,24E-57 
Lag 2 
0,491571185 -0,297773918 2,75E-07 2,90E-03 
-0,041851528 0,856603581 6,82E-01 2,44E-29 
Lag 3 
0,17366026 -0,328425344 8,89E-02 1,02E-03 
0,054327469 0,696561781 0,597140056 2,33E-15 
Lag 4 
-0,094034223 -0,356862739 3,62E-01 3,58E-04 
0,14764425 0,502267483 0,151132485 1,85E-07 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
Appendix 4 Cross-correlation between GDP and food price 
South Africa Nigeria 














1 0,510234508 0 5,87E-08 
1 0,156690082 0 1,20E-01 
0,51023451 1 5,87E-08 0 
0,15669008 1 1,20E-01 0 
Lag 1 
0,75853607 0,544378668 9,60E-20 5,73E-09 
0,96239785 0,156318692 1,05E-56 1,22E-01 
0,40755439 0,915717447 2,83E-05 3,44E-40 
0,16200622 0,915717447 1,09E-01 3,44E-40 
Lag 2 
0,63255167 0,521578355 2,81E-12 3,65E-08 
0,85800104 0,150900781 1,58E-29 1,38E-01 
0,25890795 0,705204548 0,01004649 5,24E-16 
0,16203497 0,705204548 0,11092786 5,24E-16 
Lag 3 
0,52800176 0,423675079 2,73E-08 1,53E-05 
0,70405718 0,146565277 8,66E-16 0,151990453 
0,08232141 0,431311362 0,42277095 1,03E-05 
0,15657599 0,431311362 0,12562944 1,03E-05 
Lag 4 
0,33690164 0,291908874 0,00078966 0,003904484 
0,51855358 0,148761862 6,24E-08 0,148028198 
-
0,08691469 0,138791777 0,39977329 0,177465654 
0,14093146 0,138791777 0,17081221 0,177465654 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
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Appendix 5 Cross-correlation between GDP, metal price and crude oil price 
South Africa Nigeria 
  GDP cycle 
Metal price 
cycle Pvalue GDP 
Pvalue 










1 0,353877154 0 0,000303973 1 
-
0,237227678 0 1,75E-02 
0,35387715 1 0,000303973 0 -0,23722768 1 1,75E-02 0 
Lag 
1 
0,75853607 0,534228936 9,60E-20 1,23E-08 0,962397855 
-
0,165136026 1,05E-56 1,02E-01 
0,16524414 0,94117931 0,10214658 1,68E-47 -0,29897604 0,931711854 2,65E-03 1,87E-44 
Lag 
2 
0,63255167 0,648188727 2,81E-12 5,39E-13 0,858001037 
-
0,080189202 1,58E-29 4,33E-01 
-
0,02642659 0,783901502 0,796176604 1,39E-21 -0,34305831 0,754613037 0,000544 2,90E-19 
Lag 
3 
0,52800176 0,690340647 2,73E-08 5,17E-15 0,704057183 0,017753464 8,66E-16 0,86296725 
-
0,20247574 0,558524999 0,04670613 2,77E-09 -0,3608137 0,5103182 0,00028272 9,31E-08 
Lag 
4 
0,33690164 0,657130513 0,000789658 3,56E-13 0,518553579 0,121513972 6,24E-08 0,23825131 
-
0,32717871 0,296735863 0,001139001 0,003327465 -0,35132482 0,233389317 0,00044852 0,02210927 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
Appendix 6 Cross-correlation between GDP and terms of trade 
South Africa Nigeria 
  GDP_cycle ToT_cycle pv_gdp pv_ToT GDP_cycle ToT_cycle pv_gdp pv_ToT 
Lag 0 
1 0,143929149 0 0,153105951 1 0,055978129 0 5,80E-01 
0,14392915 1 0,15310595 0 0,055978129 1 5,80E-01 0 
Lag 1 
0,75853607 0,142422041 9,60E-20 0,159645753 0,962397855 0,067497072 1,05E-56 5,07E-01 
-
0,09243305 0,420967663 0,36283994 1,43E-05 0,031791252 0,927894225 7,55E-01 2,38E-43 
Lag 2 
0,63255167 0,191087924 2,81E-12 0,059455468 0,858001037 0,07681374 1,58E-29 4,52E-01 
-
0,13050973 0,33064975 0,20023238 0,000883176 -0,00109413 0,749729832 0,99146888 6,57E-19 
Lag 3 
0,52800176 0,221845022 2,73E-08 0,028970664 0,704057183 0,092328049 8,66E-16 0,36840725 
-
0,32567562 0,177351551 0,00113322 0,082233472 -0,03184362 0,518806894 0,75683771 5,21E-08 
Lag 4 
0,33690164 0,33600285 0,00078966 0,000817264 0,518553579 0,112567095 6,24E-08 0,27485293 
-
0,30558766 0,134601045 0,00246431 0,191043464 -0,05549298 0,269648169 0,59126098 0,00788871 
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Appendix 7 Cross-correlation between GDP and export volume index 
South Africa 
  GDP cycle Export volume cycle Pvalue GDP Pvalue export volume 
Lag 0 
1 0,561359051 0 2,69E-09 
0,56135905 1 2,69E-09 0 
Lag 1 
0,7695756 0,563371117 8,14E-20 2,79E-09 
0,50973032 0,803497733 1,32E-07 1,15E-22 
Lag 2 
0,65741073 0,454763358 6,15E-13 4,13E-06 
0,36436271 0,468789406 0,00030584 1,88E-06 
Lag 3 
0,53083443 0,293353974 4,41E-08 0,004319798 
0,14456335 0,117178243 0,16680668 0,263310218 
Lag 4 
0,33532749 0,130336085 0,00108493 0,215591083 
-0,04908641 -0,186367999 0,64217269 0,075279589 
Nigeria 
  GDP cycle Export_volume cycle Pvalue GDP Pvalue export volume 
Lag 0 
1 0,360155843 0 3,13E-04 
0,36015584 1 3,13E-04 0 
Lag 1 
0,96244589 0,264482735 1,86E-54 9,60E-03 
0,42164284 0,833204435 2,09E-05 1,16E-25 
Lag 2 
0,85848822 0,136757398 2,00E-28 1,89E-01 
0,44724169 0,565932824 6,21E-06 2,78E-09 
Lag 3 
0,7054808 -0,000448189 2,90E-15 0,996598053 
0,45117772 0,299754346 5,66E-06 3,51E-03 
Lag 4 
0,52101834 -0,136788571 1,01E-07 0,19352831 
0,43083075 0,047338453 1,81E-05 0,654082676 
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Appendix 8 Cross-correlation between GDP and commodity supply 
South Africa 
 GDP cycle Commody supply cycle Pvalue GDP Pvalue commodity supply 
Lag 0 
1 0,106563061 0 2,91E-01 
0,106563061 1 2,91E-01 0 
Lag 1 
0,75853607 0,199161947 9,60E-20 4,81E-02 
-0,03778727 0,420962342 7,10E-01 1,43E-05 
Lag 2 
0,632551667 0,288151367 2,81E-12 4,01E-03 
-0,10698901 0,172079748 0,29438024 9,02E-02 
Lag 3 
0,528001755 0,244960469 2,73E-08 0,015594471 
-0,17160871 -0,038856336 0,09281494 7,06E-01 
Lag 4 
0,336901644 0,197258402 7,90E-04 0,054056315 
-0,09821066 -0,109728779 0,34111591 0,287214524 
Nigeria 
  GDP cycle Commody supply cycle Pvalue GDP Pvalue commodity supply 
Lag 0 
1 0,198412653 0 4,78E-02 
0,198412653 1 4,78E-02 0 
Lag 1 
0,962397855 0,15486648 1,05E-56 1,26E-01 
0,227376786 0,656863268 2,36E-02 1,55E-13 
Lag 2 
0,858001037 0,099241379 1,58E-29 3,31E-01 
0,241828437 0,321301182 0,01644057 1,26E-03 
Lag 3 
0,704057183 0,045538725 8,66E-16 0,657823552 
0,253687672 0,174466745 0,01216557 8,74E-02 
Lag 4 
0,518553579 -0,012436151 6,24E-08 0,904279268 
0,246463974 0,071937275 0,01549161 0,486110379 
Source: Estimation with Matlab 
 
